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This paper-  a product of the Education  and Employment Division, Population and Human Resources Department
- is part of a larger effort in PRE to understand the education sector in the broader context of Bank operations,
particularly adjustment programns,  which form the background for public expenditure reviews (PERs) in two-thirds
of the countries reviewed. It is the first step in a research agenda that includes analysis of how adjustment-related
operationsaffecttheeducation sector, how theeducation sector should betreated in PERs inhecontextofadjustment,
and how cost and financing issues should be treated in the context of the macrocconomy. Copies arc available frec
from the World Banik,  1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.  Please contact Cynthia Cristobal, room S6-035,
extension 33640 (81 pages with figures and tables).
Thc Bank's increased focus on policy-based lending  *  PERs should follow up sectoral diagnosis with
lies behind the Bank's shift from traditional public  concrete policy options, focusing not only on
investment revicws (PIRs, to identify sector or  intrasectoral but also on intersectoral re-allocation  of
investmcnt priorities) and toward public expenditure  resources.  Maniy  PERs - particularly for resource-
reviews (PERs), which include recurrent expendi-  rich countries that spend a lot on education - fail to
tures. The shift to PERs has increased attention to the  provide concrete options, perhaps feeling less necd
cost and financing of education, which is ovcrwhelm-  than resource-poor countrics to improve the effi-
ingly financed from the public sector's recurrent  ciency and equity of resource use.
budget.
- PERs are no substitutc for country and economic
According to Schwartz and Stevenson:  sector work.  If data are inadequate, more sector work
is needed for PERs to link macroeconomic and
Cost and financing analysis (and format) in PERs  sectoral issucs. Single-sector or possibly social sector
should be more standardized so conclusions needn't  PERs are more appropriatc for in-depth analysis of
be based on ad hoc international comparisons, and so  cost and financing issues.
the conclusions are more credible. Reports should
focus morc on the sustainability of proposed, as well  *  Extensive detail is no substilute for f".used
as achieved, reforms, and on the political and institu-  analysis of cducation issues and priorities in rclation
tional (as well as cconomic) impediments to  to the country's overall deveiopment program.
sustainability.  Fcw reports acknowledge that more
efficient educational processcs usually require  *  PERs should be attentive to the different time
investments in quality improvements, the added costs  framiies  needed to attain macroeconomic and educa-
for which initially outweigh the resulting savings.  tional goals; the often substantial education funds
And it should be made clear whether savings from  outsidc Lhc  conLrol  of Lhc  Ministry of Education; the
cfficiency measures are to remain within the  imbalance between, and low ratio of, capital to
subsector or be reallocated elsewhere.  recurrent education spending; the low ratio of
nonwage to wagc expenditures in the sector's
* PERs should include all sources of finaicing-  recurrent budget; and the large, capital-intensivc
public and private, local and central government - in  foreign financing component of sector funding in
the assessment of the adequacy of sector funding.  many (especially low-income) countries, often
fragmented among donors and projects.
* PERs should address the imbalance betwecn (1)
recurrent and capital spending and (2) personnel and
nonpersonnel spending.
Thc  PRE  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the fin(dings of work  under  way  in  the Bank's  Policy,  Research,  and Extemal
AffairsComplex  An objective  of the scrics is to get these findings oul  quickly,  even  if presentations  are less than fully  x)lished.
The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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earlier draft.EXvCUrWE  SUMMARY
A.  Introduction
i.  Since the early 1980s,  the Bank has been gradually shifting  away from traditional
public inves-ment  reviews  (PIRs), designed to identify  sector investment priorities within the
macro framework, to  comprehensive public expenditure reviews (PERs)  that  include
recurrent expenditures.  The Bank's increasing focus on policy-based lending, particularly
in low-income countries, has contributed io the growing reliance on comprehensive public
expenditure  reviews.  Since  education  is  largely  financed  from  public  sources,  and
overwhelmingly from  the  recurrent  budget, the  shift  from PIR  to  PER  naturally has
increased attention to education cost and financing issues.
ii.  Recent reviews have covered PERs in general and the treatment of the main
economic sectors.  Education  issues in  PERs,  however, have not  yet been  evaluated.
Specifically,  this review has the following  objectives:
a)  To assess the extent to which the increased attention to education in PERs
contributes to a more integrated treatment of education sector issues within the
overall economic environment, particularly in adjusting countries.
b)  To compare the  government's sector objectives with national expenditure
priorities  and  policy reforms  and,  where  they are  inconsistent, to  suggest
improvements.
c)  To review the diversity of methodological approach, data  treatment, and
sector coverage among education PERs, identifying best practices according to
country-specific  circumstances.
iii.  The analysis relies on a structured review of 36 reports (see annex II) which
were selected from a  larger sample of PER  and PIR reports  produced in the  1985-90
period.  Countries are classified according to a three-dimensional typology: the ratio of
govermnent revenues to GNP, education spending as a share of total government spending,
and the primary enrollment rate.  This typology,  explained in annex III, provides a rough
diagnostic framework for comparative analysis of the policy content of education PERs.
B.  The Education Sector in the Macroeconomic Context
iv.  PERs are an excellent way of bringing together country economic and sector
work (CESW) and linking macro and sector performance issues.  But few PERs succeed
in  convincingly integrating the  macro and  sector perspectives.  Many reports  seem to
include  education in  the  expenditure analysis as  a  defensive strategy--to avoid being
criticized for the sin of omission. No clear rationale is applied across reports to justify the
inclusion of education resources, or human resources in general, in the multisector reviews.
iv.  In many instances, the only link between analysis of the education sector and the
macro environment is the public sector budget constraint.  Inadequate attention is paid to
links and trade-offs between macroeconomic and sector priorities. In particular, few  reports
evaluate how proposed changes in development strategies affect educational requirements.
vi.  A particularly critical link between the macro enviromnent and the  education
sector  is wage and incomes policy.  Adjustments in teachers' salaries must be evaluated
with regard to the fiscal situation, and changes in the civil service wage structure also must
be evaluated at the sector level.  Few reports even attempt to make this link.  Education
sector work rarely includes detailed information on teachers' wages.
vii.  Reports have become more attentive to questions of suistainability  in  recent
years, but insufficient attention is still paid to conflicts  between budgetary constraints in the
short and medium term and long-term education sector objectives. Focused on expenditure
reduction, the reports exhibit little concern for the sustainability of proposed, rather than
already achieved, reforms.  Also overlooked are the political and institutional, rather than
strictly economic, impediments to sustainability.
C.  Sector Costs and Financing
viii.  The analysis of the sector financing situation, and of the costs of the services
provided, forms the  core  of  education PERs.  A major  finding of  this  report  is the
enormous diversity in coverage, quality, and  presentation of these  issues among PERs.
Although the  new reports have a more standard format and  coverage than do  the old
PERs, further progress in this direction is necessary. Greater standardization of cost and
financing analysis  is particularly important because many operationally relevant conclusions
rely on ad hoc international comparisons. The credibility of such conclusions  needs to be
enhanced through more appropriate and more widely applicable norms and standards, or
commonly accepted analytical procedures.
ix.  Assessments of the adequacy of government spending on education are based
on international comparisons or country trends, and often on both approaches combined.
There  is great  diversity in the  evaluation of governments' financial commitment to  the
sector  and  its various subsectors, with even  greater  variation  in  reports'  coverage of
important nongovermment  sources of financing.
x.  The treatmrent  of internal efficiency  issues also varies greatly in coverage and
depth.  Almost all the reports  analyze internal efficiency issues, but few integrate their
findings  with an overall assessment of the government's financial commitment to the sector.
Similarly,  international  comparisons  of  govermnent  spending  on  education  ignore
crosscountry differences in efficiency.
xi.  Almost all the reports refer to budgetary and management inefficiencies that
impair the  cost-effectiveness of education spending.  Areas of  concern that  should be
included are the imbalance between a) recurrent and capital spending, and b) personnel
and nonpersonnel expenditures.
iiD.  Sector Financing Strategies
xii.  The financing strategies that emerge from the PERs are based on an explicit,
though sometimes equivocal, sector diagnosis. Spending recommendations are not always
consistent with the overall economic assessment.  Many PERs--particularly in countries
that spend a lot on education--fail to follow up the sector diagnosis with conc - e policy
options. Reports focus on intrasectoral rather than intersectoral resource reallocation. The
assumption--usually  without clear justification--is  that intersectoral reform is less feasible
than intrasectoral reform.
xiii.  Just  as public expenditure reviews for resource-rich countries tend to  avoid
making specific sectoral financing recommendations, so those for resource-poor countries
tend to emphasize the need for intrasectoral reallocation and more efficient resource use.
The logic of this difference is clear:  the more severe the resource constraint, the greater
the need to maximize efficiency and to find other sources of financing.  But the implicit
corollary--that efficiency and equity of resource use are less serious concerns in countries
with more resources--is questionable.
xiv.  Few reports  acknowledge that  increased efficiency of educational  processes
usually requires prior investment in quality improvements, the incremental costs of which
initially outweigh the  resultirg  savings.  Furthermore,  it  is  often  unclear  from  the
recommended  efficiXncy  measures whether  realized  savings are  to  remain  within th'.
subsecter or to be reallocated to another subsector.  Consequently, the ultimate effect of
such  measures  on  the  intrasectoral  distribut.on  of  the  education  budget  remains
undetermined, even though the equity of this distribution is a stated area of concern.
xv.  Crosscountry analysis of sector financing diagnoses and strategies confirms the
need  for a country typology linking sector financing and output criteria.  The typology
adopted for this review,  though still crude, is useful in identifying  exceptions  and borderline
cases that deserve closer scrutiny.  In particular:
a)  Sector financing issues and strategies  are  relatively obvious in countries
where the level of public spending on education and the sector output are both
high or both  low.  Issues and strategies are  more complex when there  is an
imbalance between the  two criteria (for example, a high level of government
funding and low  sector output).  In these cases, the interrelated issues of quality,
efficiency, and equity predominate.
b)  In assessing the resource situation in the sector, public resource  mobilization
(the relative size of the budget) should be distinguished from public resource
allocation  to education. When education sector funding is constrained primarily
by the  size of the  public budget (relative to  GDP),  the  credibility of sector
financing recommendations  would be enhanced by a more integrated treatment
within the macroeconomic framework.
...E.  Methodolobgy
xvi.  Approaches tv cducation cost and financing issues vary greatly, as does sector
coverage, even when country circumstances are similar.  The sector specialist must bring
experience and judgment to bear, but there is still too much room for subjective  conclusions
and recommendations.  These compromise the credibility of policy recommendations.
xvii.  A big problem for the  analyst is not  knowing what part  of total  education
financing is represented by the public budget allocated to the relevant ministry. For cost-
effective and equitable financing, a  multi-source sector budget is required that  includes
allocations from ministries other than the Ministry of Education as well as from local and
nongovernment sources.  Such a  comprehensive budget also provides a basis for more
meaningful crosscountry comparisons.
xviii.  A particularly acute problem in the education sector is the imbalance between
capital  and recurrent  spending.  PERs  in recent years have usually included in  sector
expenditure analysis both types of spending.
xix.  The success or failure of public expenditure recommendations often rests upon
the  Bank's  understanding  of  the  mechanics  and  politics of  the  budget  process--the
relationship  of  the  national  accounts  to  ministerial  budgets, the  relationship  of  the
expenditure plan and budget to actual spending, and questions of intra- and intersectoral
expenditure controls.  Several PERs analyze budgeting issues thoroughly and in detail, but
rarely discuss their effect on the education sector.
F.  Conclusions and Recommendations
xx.  Public expenditure reviews  are an excel  'vehicle for analyzing  important sector
issues in the  context of the  overall economic and iiscal situation.  PERs should give as
accurate a  picture as possible of how funds to  the sector  are  allocated and disbursed.
Providing this picture entails an evaluation of the expenditure data and the expenditure
process.  In particular:
a)  If the budget process and the relationship of the budget to actual spending
are not transparent, then a budget process review may be a prerequisite for an
expenditure review.
b)  The PER  cannot be substituted for CESW.  If the necessary data are not
available, ex ante sector work is a prerequisite for any PER that attempts to
make and evaluate macro and sector links.
c)  For in-depth analysis of sector cost and financing issues, single-sector PERs,
or possibly social sector PERs, are more appropriate than multisector reviews.
xoi.  Extensive detail is not a substitute for a well-focused analytic discussion of the
principal sector issues, priorities, and policies, and their relationship--economic,  political,
and institutional--to the country's development program. Foremost, there should be a clear
ivrationale for the inclusion of education in the report and an explanation of the relationship
of the sector to the overall theme or agenda of the PER.
xxii.  The education sector (like other social sectors) has specific characteristics that
affect the relationship between sector and macro expenditures and that can skew  the impact
of "sector-neutral" policies.  PERs should pay explicit attention to these concerns, whic'
include:
a)  The  different  time  frames  for  the  attainment  of  macroeconomic and
education sector goals.
b)  The often substantial part of education sector spending (governmental and
nongovermmental) that is outside the  purview ana  control of the  Ministry of
Education.
c)  The low ratio of capital to recurrent spending in the sector and the common
imbalance between them.
d)  The low ratio of nonwage to wage expenditures within the sector's recur en.
budget.
e)  The large and capital-intensive  foreign financing  component of sector funding
in many low-income countries, which is often fragmented among many donors
and projects.
xxmi.  The treatment of the education sector in PERs must be analyzed in the broader
context of Bank operations, in particular in the context of adjustment programs, which form
the background for the PERs in two-thirds of the countries reviewed.  This report is the
first step in a broader research agenda that includes:
a)  An analysis of the effects of adjustment-related operations on the education
sector.
b)  A discussion of the treatment of the education sector in PERs in the context
of  the  economic  austerity  and  fiscal retrenchment  that  often  form  the
background for sector policy reforms.
c)  The development of guidelines for an imp-oved analysis of sector-specific
cost and financing issues in the macroeconomic expenditure context.
v. INTRODUCnION
A.  Background
1.01  Since the  early  1980s, the  Bank  has  been  shifting from  traditional  public
investment  reviews (PIRs),  designed to  identify sector  investment  priorities  within a
coherent  macro framework, to  comprehensive public expenditure reviews (PERs)  that
include recurrent  expenditures.  The traditic.-  al PIR  was often  related  to  a  national
economic plan.  The policy dimension of such a review was essentially limited to assessing
the  financial viability of  the  overall investment  program  and,  at  the  sector  level, to
identifying "white elephants." The role of education, if treated at all, was relatively minor.
1.02  The  shift from  PIR  to  PER  coincided with the  financial crisis facing the
developing world.  Many Bank borrowers increased their focus on recurrent budgets, as
PIRs and sector work uncovered sectoral evidence that operation and maintenance costs
of public assets were underfunded.  More and more, the notion of recurrent spcnding as
"unproductive" consumption lost ground to the  realization that a substantial part of the
recurrent budget is a complement to, or substitute for, capital spending. The assessment
of  the  effect of planned  investments on  public recurrent  budgets has  thus become a
standard requirement in Bank work.
1.03  The Bank's increasing focus on policy-based  iending, particularly in low-income
countries, has contributed to the growing reliance on comprehensive PERs, which have
become  an  instrument for  the  design and  monitoring of  public finance reforms  and
stabilization programs.  Adequate focus on the interdependence of capital and recarrent
expenditures is required for effective forward budgeting and cost recovery, both of which
are strategic elements in thP sustainable reduction of budget deficits.
1.04  Since education is largely  financed from public  sources, and overwhelmingly  from
the  recurrent  budget,  the shift  from PIR  to PER  naturally has increased attention  to
education cost and financing issues.  These issues have also been addressed in a growing
number of self-standing  education PERs (sector cost and financing studies).  In the Africa
region, for example, there were fo.r  education sector cost and financing studies and one
PER containing a substantial sexl.ion  on education in the years 1980 to  1984.  Over the
1985-89  period, however, there were 10 education cost and financing studies-and 32 PERs
with significant education sections. 1/
1.05  Education is one of the most labor-intensive public service sectors, by far the
largest employer within the civil service (excluding  the military), and it is a heavy burden
on the recurrent budget.  The sector investment program is small, but its implementation
generates comparatively  large incremental recurrent financing  needs. in addition, the sector
1/AFTED (1989), "Impact of the World Bank's Recent Policy Paper on Education in Sub-
Saharan Africa on Its Sector Studies and Lending Operations," p. 19, Table 8.is under constant expansionary pressure both from demographic trends  and, among the
poorest countries, from low initial levels of educational coverage.
1.06  In view of these characteristics,  education is particularly  vulnerable to the effects
of economic  adjustment and public resource constraints.  Increasingly,  therefore, the desire
to shelter the poor from the adverse social effects of adjustment has become an explicit
rationale for including the social sectors in PERs.
B.  Scope and Obiectives
1.07  Recent Bank reviews have covered PERs in general and the treatment of the
main economic sectorsY  Education sector issues in PERs, however, have not yet been
evaluated.  Specifically,  this review has the following  objectives:
a)  To assess the e: te-nt  to which the increased attention to education in PERs
contributes to a more integrated treatment of education sector issues within the
overall economic environment, particularly in adjusting countries.
b)  To  compare  the  government's sector  objectives, national  expenditure
priorities,  and  policy .eforms and,  where  they  are  inconsistent, to  suggest
improvements.
c)  To review the  diversity in methodological approach, data  treatment, and
sector coverage among education PERs, identifying  best practices according to
country-specific  circumstances.
VA study of countries undertaking structural adjustment in the period 1979 to 1983 found
that 68 percent effected reductions in education spending. In 22 percent of the cases, the
education reduction was less in percentage terms than the aggregate reduction; however,
in another 46 percent of the cases, education was among the most vulnerable sectors.  A
separate  review of six low-income and  lower-middle-income countries that  underwent
structural adjustment in the 1980s  found that the decline in public expenditure on education
as a percentage of GNP between 1980  and 1985  was 0.8 percent--almost twice the reduction
experienced by low- and lower-middle-income  countries in general.  The outcome in the
absence of managed adjustment, however, is unclear.  Marlaine E. Lockheed and Adriaan
M. Verspoor, Improving Primary Education in Developing Countries: A Review of Policy
Qptinsi,  PHR (1990),  p. 24 (draft).
2/Tariq Husain, "Public Expenditure Reviews: West African Experience 1982-86,"  World
Bank, December 19, 1986;  Tariq Husain, 'The Future Role of Public Expenditure Reviews
in the Bank," (no date); Johannes Linn, "Lessons  from the East Asia and Pacific Region:
Experience with Public Expenditure and Investment Reviews,"  June 1986;  Martha de Melo,
"Public Investment/Expenditure  Reviews: The  Bank's Experience," Country Economics
Department, June 1988  (draft); and Mohsen A. Fardi, "Generic Approaches to Expenditure
Analysis in Sectoral Public Expenditure/Investment Reviews:  The Bank's Best Practices,"
SPRPA, January 1989, (draft).
2i1.08  The standard medium-term focus of the  PER  may put the  education sector,
much inore  than the economic sectors, at a disadvantage when it comes to maintaining
quantitative and qulAitative  standards of service in the face of global resource constraints.
Indeed,  the  burden  of  economic  adjustment  and  government  retrenchment  falls
disproportionately on education and other social sectors.-  Since this review is limited to
the evidence provided in PERs, the issue will only be touched upon tangentially.  More
important, this review emphasizes the need to strengthen the integration of se'tor  policy
issues and priorities within the macroeconomic framework.
1.09  After a brief review  of the justification and operational context of PERs, section
II discusses the  relationship between global and sector issues.  In particular, it assesses
how the economic situation affects education, and how well education PERs reflect the
main macroeconomic constraints and concerns. Section III reviews  the treatment of sector
cost and financing.  The review culminates in a comparative analysis of sector financing
strategies emerging from PERs (section IV), and an assessment of quality and methodology
issues (.ection V).  Conclusions and recommendations are included in section VI.
C.  Coverage
1.10  This study is from a detailed review  of selected PER and PIR reports produced
in the five-year period 1985-90. Fol!owing a broad initial review, it was concluded that
pre-1985 reports are of limited relevance to the present PER format, which reflects greater
standardization, as well as increased breadth and depth of coverage. Many PERs refer to
other Bank studies covering sector cost and financing issues.  For comparative purposes,
an additional number of these self-standing  education PERs were selected to complement
the formal, multisector PER reports.  All together 52 reports covering 36 countries were
reviewed (21 in Sub-Saharan  Africa; 2 in Asia; 5 in Europe, the Middle East, and Northern
Africa; and 8 in Latin America and the Caribbean).
1.11  For  the purpose of analysis across countries, the sample was reduced to  one
report per country--that is, to 36 reports (see annex II).  This involved  selecting one report
for each of the 12 countries with more than one report in the total sample.  The selection
was made according to the reports' coverage of essential issues. In cases of equal ratings,
preference was given to the most recent documents and to formal PERs.  The focus was
thus maintained on PERs, but without excluding other important education expenditure
studies. The sample includes 21 standard (multisector) PERs, 3 PIRTh,  and 12 other CESW
reports, of which 6 are self-standing  education PERs.  All together, there are 28 multisector
reports and 8 reports covering only the education sector.
i/See, for example, Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly, and Frances Stewart, eds.,  Adiustment
with a Human Face.  UNICEF.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1987.
3D.  Mthodology
1.12  This report  relies on a structured review of the selected reports based on the
protocol documented in annex I, complemented by interviews with Bank staff. In addition,
a country typology  was developed as a methodological  framework for a comparative analysis
of policy issues related to education costs and financing.
Table,  Ll:  Sector  Resource Mobilizaion and Primant  Enrollment Rate
HIGH SRM  LOW SRM
MIGH  Tunisia  Philippines












LOW  Jordan  Niger
PE  Burkina Faso  Guatemala
Ghana  Guinea
Mali  Pakistan






Note:  Low-income  countries are in bold.
1.13  This typology  is documented in annex III.  In a first stage, it classifies  countries
according to two basic criteria:  sector resource  mobilization (SRM) from public sources
4relative to  GNP; and the pimary  enrollment rate (PE) as a measure of sector output.V
The sample of 36 countries is subdivided with respect to both criteria into "high"  and "low"
country groupings, depending on whether  the value of the  respective criteria  for each
country lies above or below the  median value of the  sample--2.8 percent for SRM, and
80.3 percent for PE (see annex III, table 1).  "High"  and "low"  are thus relative terms that
do not indicate value judgments.  The outcome is shown in Table M.1.
1.14  The second stage defines sector resource mobilization as the product of overall
public resource  mobilization (PRM), as reflected by the  ratio of government revenues to
GNP, and sector resource  allocation (SRA)--that is, the part of government expenditures
absorbed in the education sector. Sector resource mobilization thus depends on two distinct
policy-related parameters:  resource mobilization and resource allocation.  In the PER
context, the  former parameter  concerns the  macroeconomist, or  public finance expert,
while the  latter  is a  focus of interaction between the  macroeconomist and  the  sector
specialist. As in the first stage, countries were subdivided into "high"  and "low"  groupings
with respect to both PRM and SRA according to their median value in the sample--17.3
percent and 16.1 percent respectively (see annex III, tables 1 and 2).OJ
1.15  The end result is a three-dimensional typology (see annex III, table 3), which
enables one  to identify for each country:  (i) whether the  sector output is high or low
relative to the sector resource situation, and (ii) whether the SRM reflects predominantly
the effect of public resource mobilization, public resource allocation to the sector, or both
combined.  The typology thus provides a  rough diagnostic framework for comparative
analysis of the policy  content of education PERs, particularly on sector financing strategies.
Section III of annex III  provides a  detailed overview of policy diagnoses and strategic
implications of the various sector financing situations arising from the interplay of public
resource mobilization, sector resource allocation, and sector output.
0/This output criterion was selected because of the importance among sector objectives of
achieving universal primary education and the large share of education financing absorbed
by this subsector (around 40 percent on average in developing countries).
§/The actual position of countries on the PRM/SRA and SRM/PE scales is illustrated in
annex III, figures 1 and 2.
5IL  EDUCATAON  IN A MACROECONOMIC  CONTEXT
A.  Linking PERs and Bank-supported Adjustment Operations
2.01  Public expenditure reviews are time- and resource-intensive undertakings that
often form the core of Bank-country  dialogue about public sector priorities. They are also
essential in determining priority areas for Bank support, both project-based and policy-
based.
2.02  In two-thirds of the 36 countries, a  Bank-supported adjustment program was
under way at the time of the report or within three years before or after it. The link to the
preparation, implementation, or evaluation of adjustment operations is explicit in only one-
third of the documents (and in only one single-sector report, the  1986 Turkey Education
and Training Sector Survey). In another one-third, the adjustment program is merely the
background for the analysis of general or specific public spending priorities, often in the
form of a government expenditure or investment plan.  Only one of these is a single-sector
report,  the  1985 Nigeria Education Sector Expenditure Review.  The  final third  (five
multisector and six single-sector reports) are general analyses of public expenditures that
are not explicitly linked to a reform program or expenditure plan.
2.03  Thus, the most common reason for a PER, although not always stated as such,
is to function as an input into or evaluation of a Bank-supported adjustment program. The
explicit or implicit  justification for a PER is found in the Bank's priorities for its work in
the country more often than in the country's fiscal management priorities.  Indeed, some
Bank and outside experts have contended that the justification for a public expenditure plan
is  derived  from  Bank, rather  than  country, priorities.  These  critics often  find little
coherence between the  public expenditure planning and management exercise and  the
government budget, or between the budget and actual spending. The public expenditure
review is intended precisely to bring clarity and predictability to the process, but in many
countries it remains an artificial, externally imposed device not viewed as useful by the
implementing government. For many multisector PERs, much of the sector-level data are
not collected in the  field but  are  derived by Bank staff or  consultants working on  the
government's budget or plan.  Because of the constraints of the process, the sector analyses
are often macro driven.
B.  Including Education in PERs
2.04  No clear rationale is applied across reports to justify the inclusion of education
or human resources in the multisector reviews. Of the 28 multisector PERs, 16 include all
principal economic and  social sectors, including education.  Half  of  these justify the
inclusion of  education by stating that  social services are,  or  should be, a government
priority.  In addition, five reports focus on the broader rubric of human resources.  Of
i/World Bank Seminar on Public Expenditure Planning and Management, April 25, 1990,
SEMA Group Management Consultants.
6these, the Jordan report focuses on the distributional effect of economic development and
the  Bolivia report  on the  social sectors.  The Botswana, Central African Republic, and
Cameroon reports treat  education briefly under the category of human resources.]
2.05  The Bolivia PER with Special Emphasis on the Social Sectors (1989) presents
a clear rationale for its choice of sectors. It reviews the link between public expenditures
and economic performance and analyzes the effects of the government adjustment program
on public spending. A primary goal of the program was to diminish the role of the public
sector  while  increasing spending and  improving the  efficiency and  equity of  delivery
programs in the  social sectors.  Consequently, health, education, and social security are
reviewed in separate, but brief, chapters.  At the  other extreme, the  Madagascar report
states that education is one of the largest government budget categories, but the sector is
not included in the report because a major government review is still under way. Although
the institutional difficulties of waiting for the government's report are understandable, it is
hard to have faith in the conclusions  of a PER when information about one of the major
government expenditure posts is not available.
2.06  Among the seven multisector reports that explain the choice of sectors within
the budgetary framework, four include education because it is one  of the three  or four
largest items  in  the  government budget.  Three  reports  emphasize social services as
essential to the attainment of long-term development goals. In the remaining reports, the
lack of  a  stated  rationale  implies that  education is such an  important sector  that  its
inclusion need not  be explained.  The opposite circumstance exists in the  eight single-
sector reports, which focus on the education budget with only minor attention to the overall
public budget.  If a large and essential sector is excluded from the review, or if education
is included only cursorily because it is a high-visibility  sector, the  validity of the PER's
recommendations may  be compromised. The justification for an expenditure review of one
or several sectors should clearly explain the inclusion or exclusion of sectors according to
the overall emphasis of the PER.
C.  The Macroeconomic Context for PERs
2.07  One  report  (Mali) completely ignores the  country's economic situation, and
another (Niger) provides only the briefest summary of the macroeconomic environment,
comparing its declining per capita GDP unfavorably  with other countries in Francophone
Africa. Characteristically,  both of these reports are single-sector  PERs.  The remaining 34
reports provide some review of the macroeconomic situation.  Figure IL.1  summarizes the
macroeconomic situation according to the country typology  as worsening (11 cases), stable
(12), or improving (11).  The macroeconomic assessment appears to be inversely  related to
the public resources situation (that is, optimistic in low SRM countries, and pessimistic in
high SRM countries). The time frame for the macroeconomic  forecast is short- to medium-
term (usually three to five years) in 14 of the reviews,  long-term (looking toward the late
1990s)  in 14, and unspecified in the remaining 8 countries.
2/See annex V for a complete matrix of sectors included in each report.
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2.08  The  need  to  limit public  spending  is the primary  macroeconomic  constraint  in
most countries  included  in the  review.  Restrictions  on the public budget  can be the  result
of  1)  decreasing  public  revenues  or  2)  increasing  expenditures  that  have  led  to
unsustainable  deficits or the  adoption  of austerity  programs.  In nearly one-quarter  of the
macroeconomic  analyses,  the  country  was  described  as facing  a  severe  economic  crisis
caused  by declining  terms  of  trade  or  other  exogenous  shocks such  as  drought,  floods,
external  disruptions  to  transportation  routes,  and  war.
2.09  Approximately  half of the reports  either  do not define  a macro  strategy  (single-
sector reports)  or do not discuss any links between  macro and  sector strategies.  In Turkey
and  Senegal,  for  example,  an  important  macro  priority  is  to  encourage  private  sector
involvement  in  the  economy,  yet  the  private  sector  is not  mentioned  as  an  important
provider  and  consumer  of trained  manpower.
2.10  Another  common economy-wide priority is export-oriented  growth (15 countries).
This  objective is only supported  by specific education  policies  (promoting  skills training  as
a priority)  in  four reports.  In the  other  countries,  the  macro  objective  is not  reflected  in
specific goals for the education  sector.  The inverse is also true:  nine reports  cite expansion
8of, or quality improvements in, vocational training as a priority without clear reference to
the macro analysis.
2.11  Although all but two reports pay some attention to the macroeconomic context
for the sector analysis, the treatment is uneven.  There is a particular gap in the analysis
of economy-wide policy priorities that need to be reflected in sector policies and trade-
offs.
D.  Macroeconomic and Education Sector Links
2.12  In analyzing the relationship between the macroeconomic situation and sector
concerns, a number of questions should be addressed.  These include:
a)  What is the overall resource situation?
b)  What is the public sector's resource situation?
c)  How is the size of the resource allocation to education affected by priorities
in other sectors, or by political, institutional, or other external forces?
d)  What noneducation priorities or exogenous factors affect education sector
priorities?
e)  Are  there  changing economic circumstances, for example as  a result  of
adjustment, that could alter the external efficiency  of the education system?
f)  Are there external threats to the sustainability  of education sector objectives?
2.13  These questions are relevant to most sectors.  Four specific concerns of the
social sectors are noteworthy. One is the time frame for the review. The obvious conflict
between short- to medium-term development goals and the long-term benefits of education
spending is often overlooked in multisector PERs, which tend to focus on macroeconomic
growth within the medium term (three to five years).  But in the long term the quality and
quantity of educational output may suffer declines that are not apparent during short-term
fiscal retrenchment.
2.14  A  second  problem  is  the  largely recurrent  nature  of  education  spending.
Because education is labor intensive, wages make up a large share of the recurrent budget,
and because  education is overwhelmingly a  public sector endeavor  in  most countries,
economy-wide  public expenditure adjustments may have a greater than proportional effect
on the education sector (see box 111.1).  Third, education spending is often divided among
several ministries or  levels of govermnent.  Capital spending is  often  allocated  to  a
noneducation  ninistry (the Ministry of Public Works, for example), so imbalances between
capital and recurrent spending are difficult to rectify within a narrow, sector perspective.
A fourth problem in many low-income  countries is the high proportion of foreign financing
in  the  social  sector  investment  budget.  Foreign-financed inputs  are  often  ad  hoc,
unsystematic, and driven by donor, not country, priorities.
92.15  The ability to confidently  analyze  general and sector-specific  issues would require
massive flows of information and analysis of feedback mechanisms in both  directions--
from the  economy to the  education sector and vice versa.  In an ideal world, all of the
necessary data would be available, and the intra- and intersectoral relationships would be
transparent.  In  reality,  however,  time  and  resources  are  always  constrained,  and
information is  always imperfect.  Nevertheless, the  following links  are  of  particular
importance to understanding how the education sector relates to government expenditure
priorities.
2.16  Bxernal  forces driving education policies. Three-quarters of the reports make
explicit reference to  external forces that influence education policy.  The percentage is
slightly higher among high PE countries, perhaps because a large education sector involves
a large share of the population, and is more dependent upon other social, economic, and
political forces.  The most frequently mentioned external factors include:
a)  Demographic pressure.  A high rate  of population growth is the  most
common  external  factor  (in  one-half of  the  countries  studied)  influencing
education policy. In some countries, a high demand for education coupled with
a  high  population  growth rate  force  increased  allocations for  educational
expansion at  all  levels.  In  other  countries, increased enrollment rates  and
expansion of the school system (in Tunisia, for example, universal education is
to be expanded from six to nine years) are an intermediate means of reducing
the number of new entrants into the labor force because sufficient employment
and other opportunities for young people are lacking.
b)  Demand for education.  Only a few reports (Guinea, Pakistan) explicitly
make the connection between the demand for education and external efficiency.
These reports argue that changes in the demand for education (in general or for
specific skills) are a  rational response to changing perceptions about the job
market for graduates with various skills.
c)  Labor market  needs.  Economic development is impeded in Turkey and
Lesotho because of shortages of skilled labor.  Several reports acknowledge  that
out-migration of skilled labor greatly affects the education sector, which must
take into account domestic and foreign employment opportunities.  The Haiti
report  points out that increased spending on vocational and higher education
would not be efficient because Haitian off-shore industry  employs primarily low-
skilled workers.  In most reports, however, the macro level concern about out-
migration and a  lack of skilled labor, particularly in the  light of skills-based
outward-oriented growth, is not translated into sector reform toward that end.
d) Donor preferences. Several African reports pointedly refer to the importance
of  donor  preferences  in  determining  education  policy.  In  Malawi, donor
preferences are  reflected in an economy-wide budget that  is too investment
intensive, and in the choice of specific  investment priorities. The study finds that
foreign donors are more willing to shift funding from investment to recurrent
10needs  if  the  macroeconomic  situation  is  stabilized.  In  other  words,
macroeconomic adjustment is essential before donors are willing to  finance
activities without a tangible output.  In the Central African Republic, no global
program of investment priorities exists, and almost all investment is externally
financed.  Reports recommend closer coordination and better prioritization of
donor projects, but they offer little structure for so doing.
2.17  External threats to the sustainability of education priorities.  As illustrated in
figure 11.2,  concerns for the sustainability of sector achievements seem to be motivated by
the fear of slipping on performance standards that have already been met, either in terms
of primary enrollments  or sector  resource  mobilization. Where both these indicators are low,
only one report voices concerns about sustainability. When one indicator is low and the
other is high, 43 percent of the reports discuss  sustainability,  and all but one reports do this
when both indicators are high. Ten reports express concern that current subsidy  levels are
unsustainably high given public budget constraints.
Figure  112: Threats to Sustainability
ot  Education  Sector Priorities
I  0a  % ot countries in each category
!100-
8  0  - ...........  ........  ................................  .....  ....................................
60  ...... t  ............................................  . .................................................  Contry
Categories
4  0 - A.  .....  I  ..........................  _  All countiles
High SRII/Eigh PE
2  0  - ..  . ..... . . . . . ............  ME  igh SRI  ILow PE
Low SRII/Hiqb FE
Lov SRII/LoU  PE
0
All threats,  Demographic pressure
Budqet constraint  Demand
'The category 'All threats'  includes the budget constraint,  denographic pressure,
iind the demand for education, but is not necessarily  the sun  of the other three
ue to double countinq.
112.18  Except for the budget constraint, there is little discussion of external threats to
proposed policies ex ante.  Other  threats addressed in only a few cases are population
growth and the demand for education.  In many countries, the social demand for higher
e^ducation exceeds  the  requirements  of  the  labor  market  and  jeopardizes  both  the
intrasectoral balance of resource allocation and the ability to provide quality education.
A similar problem is the conflict between the demands of the labor market for vocationally
skilled workers and the  low social demand for vocational training relative to  academic
training in many countries.
2.19  The Turkey Education and Training Sector Survey  is one of the few reports that
addresses the implications for education of a changing economy.  It clearly states that the
outward-oriented economic development program and attendant need for skilled labor has
major implications for human resources policies. Most reports, however, do not specifically
discuss the effect of noneducation policies on education.
E.  Sector Issues and Priorities
2.20  Exansion.  access. and equity.  The reports cover numerous sector issues at
various educational levels.  For the purpose of this review, the issues are divided into the
following  broad categories for primary and postprimary education:  access, quality, equity,
and internal and external efficiency. Many developing  countries have greatly expanded their
educational system, particularly primary education, but this does not necessarily reflect an
improvement in the above-mentioned areas of concern. Equality of access to education by
sex, region, religious, ethnic or  other group; equity among income levels; the  quality of
education; the internal efficiency  of the system (drop-out and repeater rates, unit costs per
graduate); and external efficiency (the relationship of the skills taught to the demand for
them in the labor market) are all priority sector issues that shed light on the costs and
benefits of expansion of the school system.
2.21  Figures II.3 to II.5 categorize reports that not only mention these sector issues
but explicitly treat  them as priorities.  Figure ID.3  divides the treatment  of the issues by
primary and postprimary education; figures II.4 and 11.5  graphically present the difference
in  coverage of  these priorities according t-  the  typology.  The discussion that follows
includes reports  that  mention  the  issues without  necessarily prioritizing them.  The
percentages given may, therefore, differ slightly from those in the graphs, which measure
explicit priorities.
2.22  Stated sector priorities in the reports reviewed (figure II.3) appear to be largely
focused on the primary level, particularly in the case of access, quality, and equity issues.
This focus is in line with current chinking  inside and outside the Bank, which emphasizes
primary  education  as  the  key  to  universal  basic  literacy.  From  an  overall  sector
management perspective, however, there is no rationale for access,  quality, and equity issues
commanding a lower priority at the postprimary level than at the primary level.
2.23  Expansion of the education system is most frequently mentioned as a sector
prioiity at the primary level, and, as one might expect, particularly in low PE countries in
the  low-income range.  Postprimary expansion is more  often  an objective in  high PE
12countries.  Primary  expansion is suggested most  frequently for countries  in  the  low
SRM/low PE group, whereas postprimary expansion is advised for high SRM/high PE
countries.
2.24  Similarly,  the need to imLprove  access to primary education is most frequently
suggested for low SRM/low PE countries,  but in the middle-income  rather than low-income
range.  Interestingly, equity issues concerning postprimary levels are  most frequently
mentioned with respect to the group of countries that combine a high primary enrollment
rate with a low sector resource situation (high PE/low SRM).  Special concerns are the
urban poor, rural areas, girls, and disadvaittaged regions and ethnic groups.
Figure  11.3:  Sector Priorities
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2.25  Education quality. Thirty of the 36 countries at the primary level and about half
of the countries at the postprimary level recommend improvements in education quality.
Specific  quality concerns include more supplies and materials; better maintenance, teacher
training, and management and supervision;  curriculum improvements; and higher teachers'
salaries, especially for teachers of quantitative subjects.
132.26  At the primary level, quality improvement is a stated priority among low-income
countries more often than among middle-incomre  countries. At this level, moreover, it has
the highest incidence among countries that combine a low SRM with a high PE, or vice-
versa, suggesting that  an imbalance between sector resources and  sector output raises
specific equity issues (see  annex III).  At the  postprimary level, recommended quality
improvements appear to be unrelated to a country's SRM or PE situation.
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2.27  Internal efficiency. Almost all reports provide data on drop-out and repeater
rates, student/teacher  ratios, and unit costs per student.  All but three reports (Botswana,
Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone) discuss  internal efficiency,  particularly at the
primary level.  A principal objective is to  reduce unit cost per  graduate  by improving
student flows and  transition rates and  increasing school retention.  However, only one
14report (Malawi) actually presents data on unit cost per graduate, rather than per studentY
Instead,  the  reports  concentrate  on  gross versus net  enrollment and  drop-out  and/or
repeater  rates as indicative of the gap between cost per student and cost per graduate.
Figure 11.5: Sector Priorities
Postprimary Education
6  of countries  in each  category
60-
50- . .....  ...............  ...  ......  ..........................  .....
4 0-  ..............................  ......  .......  . ......... unt y
3 0 - - .................... _.All  Categories
All
20  . ,  .......  ................  ... 3....  HZ  igh SR]I/Htgh  PE
H  .igk  SRIIILow  PE
1.0  ~~~~~~~~~.  .. Low SRIfIIlliq  PE
10-L _ow  SR1/Low PE
Access  Eqaily  EilecDal  efficiency
Quality  lnternal ettictency
S  ectoi  Priorities
2.28  All of the countries where public spending per student (rather than total unit
cost per student) is considered excessive are advised to  reduce it, usually by increasing
internal efficiency. As is the case with equity issues, concern for internal efficiency  is most
common in countries with an imnbalance  between sector resources and output (either high
SRM/low PE or low SRM/high PE countries). At the primary level, internal efficiency  is
most important in high PE countries--that is, countries where high enrollment has already
been achieved, perhaps at the expense of quality and cost-efficiency  of output (figure I1.4).
2/Per graduate expenditure is the cost of producing a graduate of a particular education
program, taking into account the total number of years of educational output required at
the  prevailing internal efficiency rate.  Total educational output, at a given annual per
student cost, includes wastage from repeaters and drop-oi vs.
15At  the  postprimary  level, low SRM countries--that  is, countries where  resources  are
constrained--exhibit most concern  for internal  efficiency issues (figure 11.5). Although
internal  efficiency ranks  high  as  an  identified  sector  issue  both  at  the  primary and
postprimary levels, only half the reports recommend policies designed to improve internal
efficiency--policies  that would lead to better qualified teachers, more materials, lower unit
cost per graduate, and so on.  For example, only 10 of 25 countries where drop-out and
repeater  rates are considered to be a problem are specifically  advised to reduce them.
2.29  The relationship of the internal efficiency improvements recommended in the
education sector chapter to the overall cost and financing analysis of the macro chapters
is particularly weak.  How many more (or fewer) teachers?  What is the cost of upgrading
the quality of teachers?  How does the goal of lower unit cost per graduate relate to the
various components of unit cost per student, and what are the immediate and longer term
implications of this goal for the education budget?
2.30  External efficiency. About two-thirds  of the reports argue that education sector
expenditures are inefficient  on the basis of external efficiency  criteria. This problem is cited
most frequently for high PE countries, and  in single-sector reports.  Eighteen reports
describe unemployment rates by level of education completed. Of these, 12 cite figures for
unemployment  rates  among  higher  education  graduates.  One-third  of  the  reports
recommend improving the external efficiency  (employment of graduates) of the education
system, although again the  details, particularly regarding costs and  benefits, are  often
unspecified.
2.31  Few, primarily high SRM countries, prioritize external efficiency  at the primary
level.  Concern for external efficiency is much greater at the postprimary level among all
country categories, but particularly among countries with an imbalance of indicators (high
SRM  and  low PE or  vice versa).  In  general, concern  for the  external  efficiency of
education is significantly  higher in high PE than in low PE countries (74 percent versus 47
percent of the  reports).  This seems logical, suggesting a critical PE level below which
concerns for the social returns (basic needs, literacy, equity, poverty-alleviation,  and so on)
to investment in primary education prevail, and above which concerns for economic and
private returns to more costly investment in postprimary education and training take over.
Unfortunately, few reports mention the effects of noneducation and macroeconomic  policies
on the external efficiency  of education/training processes.
F.  Overall Assessment
232  Many reports  seem  to  include education  in  the  expenditure analysis as  a
defensive strategy--to avoid being criticized for the  sin of omission.  In  only a  few is
education an integral part of the economic development or adjustment strategy. As a result,
it is often unclear how the implementation of sector priorities would affect economy-wide
goals.
2.33  The opposite is also true, although less frequently. In many instances, the sector
review has taken place in  a void wherein the  only connection to  the overall economic
environment is a budget constraint.  Inadequate attention is paid to external factors and
16policy  priorities  that may influence  education  policy,  with the exception  of demographics.
In particular,  few reports clearly  analyze  how changes  in a country's  product mix  (moving
from nontradables  to tradables,  for example)  are linked to education  requirements.
2.34  It is difficult  for poor countries  to allocate  donor  financing  efficiently.  From  the
perspective  of the PER, a first  step toward  more efficient  allocation  is to collate  all outside
financing  to the sector by project and by its capital  and recurrent components.
2.35  Reports have become much more attentive to questions of sustainability  in
recent years,  but insufficient  attention  is still paid to conflicts  between  medium-  and long-
term priorities. Except  for the budget  constraint,  reports  exhibit  little concern  for proposed
reforms  (rather than those already  achieved)  and for the political  and institutional,  rather
than strictly  economic,  impediments  to sustainability.
17IIL  SECTOR COSTS  AND FINANCING
3.01  The analysis  of sector financing,  and of the costs of the services provided, forms
the  core of  the public expenditure review, which leads to the  formulation of financing
strategies and to the assessment of their overall effect on the budget.  What is the current
and prospective level of sector resources relative to defined priorities and objectives, and
how efficiently  does the sector manage these resources?  In this context, one might expect
education PERs to take a clear position on the following  issues:
a)  The adequacy of the resources allocated to the sector.
b)  The potential for nongovernment resources to be mobilized in the sector.
c)  The adequacy of the intrasectoral allocation of budgetary resources.
d)  The efficiency of public management of sector resources.
3.02  There  is  enormous diversity in  coverage, quality, and  presentation  among
education PERs with regard to the analysis of sector cost and financing issues.  Greater
standardization is needed, particularly since many operationally relevant conclusions  in this
area  appear  to  rely  on  ad-hoc  international  comparisons.  The  credibility of  such
conclusions needs to be enhanced through specific research focusing on the development
of  more  appropriate  and  more  widely applicable norms and  standards, or  commonly
accepted analytical procedures.
A.  Budgetary Resource Allocation
3.03  Among  the  36  reports,  16  consider the  level of  government  spending on
education to be insufficient,  and 8 to be relatively high.  As many as 12 reports, of which
9 are multisector PERs, do not make a judgment on this issue. Among these 12 reports,
there are cases of apparent sector underfinancing,  with budgetary allocation to the sector
as low as 8 percent of total government expenditures (for example, Tanzania and 7,ambia).
There are also cases of relatively high, and likely unsustainable, budgetary allocation.  For
example, Rwanda has allocated 28 percent of its budget to  education--a budget that is
heavily constrained by a low rate of public resource mobilization (13 percent of GNYP).Y
I/As documented in annex III, country characteristics (such as sector resource mobilization,
public resource mobilization, sector resource allocation, and the primary enrollment rate)
are assessed against the median value of each characteristic in the sample of 36 countries
covered in the study:  SRM, 2.67 percent of GNP;  PRM, 16.7 percent of GNP;  SRA,
16.0 percent  of  total  government expenditure;  and  PE,  80.85 percent  gross primary
enrollment  rate.  Such  assessments are  comparative findings rather  than  normative
judgments.  As such, however, they point to a potential issue requiring further attention.
Rwanda's budgetary allocation to education is comparatively  high,  but whether it is too high
depends on a host of other factors.
183.04  By and large, assessments of go- ernment financing for education are consistent
with the country typology  established for comparative analysis. As shown in table I1.1, the
proportion of reports considering  government spending to be insufficient,  or high, is related
to the sector resource  mobilization (SRM) criterion and, to a lesser extent, to the primary
enrollment rate (PE) criterion; 13 of the  16 "insufficient' assessments relate to low SRM
countries, and 7 of the 8 "high"  assessments are for high SRM countries.
3.05  Government spending on education (SRA) is considered insufficient in three
high SRM countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Lesotho.  All three are in the low-income
range,  and  the  first two also  have a  relatively low sector  output in  terms  of primary
enrollment rates, which to  some extent justifies the assessment.  Government spending
on education is rated  high in one low SRM country, Madagascar (2.4 percent of GNP).
The  basis for this assessment lies perhaps in  the  report's  narrow focus on the  budget
allocation to  the  sector (16 percent), which is the  sample's median value, without due
attention to its relatively low overall public resource mobilization (15.1 percent, compared
with 16.7 percent for the sample).
Table M.1:  Goverument Spending on Education
Low  High  Position  TQIal
Country Groupings
Low SRM/Low PE  5  (71%)  0  (0%)  2  (29%)  7  (100%)
Low SRM/High PE  8  (61%)  1  (8%)  4  (31%)  13  (100%)
High SRM/Low PE  2  (20%)  4  (40%)  4  (40%)  10  (100%)
High SRM/High  PE  1  (17%)  3  (50%)  2  (33%)  6  (100%)
Total  16  (43%)  8  (22%)  12  (33%)  36  (100%)
3.06  Assessments of the adequacy of government spending on education are based
on international comparisons or country trends, and often on both approaches combined.
However, the nature of international comparisons and the type of trends examined differ
widely country by country, along with the quality and credibility of the assessment.
3.07  First, the  definition of the  government's financial commitment to  the  sector
differs from country to country.  Reports usually focus on the share of education in total
or recurrent government expenditures, or on the ratio of government education expenditures
alBurkina Faso is also a border case with respect to SRM:  2.9 percent of GNP versus the
sample's median value of 2.79 percent.
19to GNP.  Both approaches have weaknesses that can compromise the interpretation  of
trends  or  of  international  comparisons, unless they are  used in  combination.  Budget
allocation percentages (total or recurrent) show the government's financial commitment to
the sector, but fail to  measure the ultimate impact of this commitment on the effective
mobilization of sector resources relative to the national resource base.  Niger and Senegal,
for example, both allocate about 21 percent of the government budget on education, but
this conmmitment  represents more than 4 percent of GNP  in Senegal and only about 2
percent in Niger.  Alternatively, public spending on education in Niger and Cameroon
represents about  the same percentage of GNP, but in Cameroon this outcome reflects a
significantly  lower  level of government financial  commitment to the sector (about 13  percent
of the budget) than in Niger.
3.08  Second,  the  standards  used  in  international  comparisons differ  markedly.
Government financial commitment to education can be measured against the corresponding
average for all  LDCs combined, for the  entire  continent, for the  region, for selected
individual countries, or for a specific LDC income group.  In a number of cases (6 of 22
international comparisons), government spending on education is vaguely characterized as
higher/lower than in "other" or "similar" countries (with or without regional reference).
lThis  comparative evidence, which is often used  to  make a case for spending more on
education, does not have a solid analytic base.  Turkey's report  is an example of good
practice in this respect:  it makes comparisons with other countries not necessarily in the
same region or with the same income but according to specific criteria.  For example, it
compares enrollments by level of education and government spending on education as a
share of all government spending and as a share of GNP with South Korea, another country
committed to growth from the export of manufactured goods.
3.09  Third, whereas most reports analyze internal efficiency  issues, few integrate this
analysis  with the overall assessment  of the government's financial  commitment to the sector.
Similarly,  international  comparisons  of  government  spending  on  education  ignore
crosscountry differences in sector efficiency,  which further limits their usefulness.
3.10  Ten of the reports focus on the implications of the sector resource constraint for
beneficiaries, as evidenced by a decline in real expenditures  per student, and eight of these
incorporate this evidence into the assessment of the governrnent's financial commitment to
education.  A number of reports  cover the  evolution of real expenditures and  student
enrollments, but do not derive the underlying  trend in unit expenditures. Unit expenditures
per graduate rather than per student, which conveniently integrate the internal efficiency
dimension in the sector cost and financing analysis, are mentioned in only three  reports
(Malawi, Morocco, Lesotho), and actually quantified in only the first of the three.  Again,
the  lack of information on unit costs per graduate reflects the tremendous difficulties in
obtaining or estimating these figures.
3.11  Over  one-third  of  the  reports  describe  a  decline  in  the  share  of  public
expenditures allocated to education; most do not explain the phenomenon, or they refer
vaguely to adjustment-related austerity measures.  Several reports simultaneously express
concern about a substantial decline in real teachers' salaries, which makes it harder for the
education system to  attract and ietain  qualified staff.  Few reports, however, make the
20connection between the relative evolution of personnel versus nonpersonnel expenditures,
and what ultimately happens to the share of government expenditures going to educatiom
A fall in civil service wages relative to the  average price of nonpersonnel expenditures,
other  things being equal,  seemingly leads  to  a  reduction in  the  share  of government
spending accruing to the most labor-intensive sectors, among which is education (see box
111.1). This tendency is further exacerbated where teachers' salaries have declined more
than the average civil service wage.
3.12  The Bolivia report is an interesting exception in this respect.  It acknowledges
that  the  country's adjustment program  has resulted in  a decline in  government social
spending in real terms and as a share of total expenditures (spending declined from 35
percent in 1984 to 25 percent in 1986  and then recovered to 30 percent in 1988). It argues,
however, that the "social  cost of adjustment" is not as high as the evidence suggests  because
the expenditure item that has fallen is salaries, particularly of teachers, whereas purchases
of school materials and health supplies were about ten times higher in 1988 than in 1984.
The report  concludes that, whiie the fall in teachers' salaries would lower the quality of
education in the long run if not remedied, expenditures on materials and supplies "have a
more direct short-term relationship with the quality of the services rendered."  Hence, the
evidence indicates "that quality has improved following  the adjustment." 2'
3.13  Public expenditure  reviews should give more  attention  to  the  relationship
between structural adjustment and public resource allocation to social sectors.  This issue
is  much  more  complex than  can  be  observed  from  aggregate intersectoral  resource
allocation percentages, which are  sometimes targeted  in policy-based Bank lending for
education. They are rather unreliable indicators of government intentions and performance,
unless these expenditures are broken down by purpose or by end use, and can be compared
with sector objectives.
B.  Non-Central-Government Resources
3.15  With a  few exceptions, all reports  cover non-central-government financing at
various levels of  the  education system, providing scattered quantitative  or  qualitative
evidence (see figure III.1). PER emphasis on the mobilization of nongovermnent resources
is most prevalent for low SRM countries, as well as for high PE countries where sustaining
a  high  primary enrollment  rate  requires  the  continuing availability of  complementary
financing.
l/Bolivia--Public  Sector Expenditure Review with a Special Emphasis on the Social Sectors
(Report No. 7746-BO,  September 1989), Chapter III, pp. 25-27.
21Box M.1:  Civil Service Wages and Public Spending on Education
How do relative changes in civil service salaries affect public spending on
education?  Consider this simple example. A country has an initial government
budget of 100 units, distributed as follows:
Situ-ation  1:  Government Budget
Share of
Education
Expenditures  Total  -LEducation  in Total
Personnel  40  (40%)  14  (78%)  35%
Nonpersonnel  60 ("QO4)  7  .222?  1%
Total  100 (100%)  18 (100%)  18%
Education absorbs 18  percent of the total budget (recurrent and capital, but
excluding the debt servicing burden).-J  Pcrsonnel expenditures account for 40
percent of total government expenditures, but they represent about  twice this
much in the education sector budget (78 percent).
In  many  countries, particularly in  Sub-Saharan Africa, adjustment  and
budgetary retrenchment have led to a drastic decline in civil service wages. This
is particularly true where governments have protected employment rather  than
incomes.P/  Situation 2 assumes a  50 percent  cut in  personnel  expenditures,
reflecting an identical cut in average wages at an initially constant govermnent
employment  rate.  The  wage  cut  is  identical  in  all  government  sectors;
nonpersonnel expenditures remain constant in real terms.
Situation 2:  Government Budget
Share of
Education
Expenditures  Total  Education  in Total
Personnel  20  (25%)  7  (64%)  35%
Nonpersonnel  60  (7%o)  4  (36%)  7  To
Total  80 (100%)  11 (100%)  14%
Whereas  the  share  of  education  in  each  expenditure  component  has
remained constant (35 percent for personnel expenditures  and about 7 percent for
nonpersonnel  expenditures),  its share  of  the  total  budget  has  automatically
declined from  18 percent  to  14 percent because  of  the  higher incidence of




Pressure is strong to increase government employment, overall and at the
sector  level, at  the  cost  of  nonpersonnel  expenditures, particularly  material
consumption.rY  Situation 3 assumes that half the decrease in real wages is offset
by incremental  hiring, albeit within the  new budgetary ceilings prevailing in
Situation 2.
Situation  3:  Government  Budget
Share of
Education
Expenditures  Total  Edulcation  in Total
Personnel  30  (38%)  10.5 (95%)  35%
Nonpersonnel  50  (62%)  0.5  (5%)  1%
Total  80 (100%)  11.0 (100%)  14%
The personnel budget has shrunk, while the number of civil servants has
grown.  Consequently, personnel costs have increased from 78 percent to  95
percent of the sector budget, and the proportion of nonpersonnel expenditures has
eroded.
This scenario makes clear that change in the allocation to the  education
sector is not always the result of concrete reallocative decisions.  In fact, if the
share of  education  in  the  total  budget  remains unchanged in  the  face of  a
governiment-wide  fall in real wages, the sector perhaps is being sheltered from the
effects of adjustment.
'/Situation  1 is based on the following  assumptions: 20 percent of the recurrent
budget is allocated to  education but only 10 percent of the capital budget; the
ratio of recurrent to capital expenditure in education is 10:1;  and personnel costs
account for  50 percent  of the  total  recurrent  budget and  85 percent  of the
recurrent education budget.
t-/Average  civil service salaries in Zaire, for example, fell by more than 80 percent
between 1975  and 1985  (Zaire--Education Sector Memorandum, Report No. 7169-
ZR, February, 1989).
£'/Until  recently, many countries guaranteed public employment for graduates of
secondary and  higher education.  At  the  sector  level, demographic pressure
combined with low initial enrollment rates create a rapidly increasing need for
teaching staff.
233.16  Thirteen reports refer to the provision  and financing  of educational  services  by
local governments,  but few  provide  quantitative  estimates,  and in some  cases  it is not clear
whether and to what extent  local  governments  are financed  through  the central  government
budget. Most reports mention  private education  financing,  either through  private  schools
or through parental contributions  to the financing  of public schools,  but again they cite
scant quantitative  evidence. Only about one-third  of the reports give the contribution  of
foreign  donors to the financing  of the sector's  capital  or recurrent budget. The last area
is clearly  one in which  the Bank is w  A positioned  to assist  in providing  better oversight.
Chapter V discusses  each of these items  in detail (para. 5.09-5.19).
Figure  HI11  Coverage of Non-Central-
Governient Sources of Financing
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3.17  On the  whole, the design of sector financing strategies requires a  more
comprehensive  assessment  of total national spending  on education,  and of its distribution
among the various participating actors, than is usually reflected in education PERs.
Admittedly,  the time and effort needed to generate  such a comprehensive  assessment  are
well beyond  the resources  available  for PERs. It is therefore  the function  of sector  work
to try to provide  the required  knowledge  base. A comprehensive  statement  of the financing
structure of the public education  sector, which  includes  contributions  from sources  other
24than ti;e central government, remains a minimum requirement.  In several of the reviewed
cases, su-h an evaluation could have been provided since most of the required informationi
was contVined in the report but not integrated, or was available from sector work but not
used (see boxes I11.2  and 111.3).
am,k  WI.! fblic  Spendinmg  on Education hi Haiti and Tanzania
Haiti's education indicators resemble those of low-income  African countries
more than those of its Caribbean neighbors or Asian low-income countries.  But
unlike most Africaan  countries, the Haitian educational system depends heavily on
nongovernment financing sources. Public recurrent and investment expenditure
for FY 1983 was about 9 percent of all government spending, equal to about 1.5
percent of GDP.  Total education expenditure--public  and private--amounted to
more than 6 percent of GDP, of which only about 20 percent was funded from
the Treasury.  Thirty percent came fiom external sources and from local and
foreign charities (official donor aid plus religious organizations and NC-Os);  fifty
percent came from parents.
Public spending on education in Tanzania represents a larger share of GDP,
2.4 percent in FY 1987. Although local authorities and parents spend some on
primary education, these amounts are small relative to the total budget. Since the
central goverrnent  provides almost all education financing, total sector spending
in Tanzania remains at about 2.4 percent of GDP  despite education's similar
share of the public budget (10 percent compared with 9 percent in Haiti).
One  might  conclude  that  Tanzania  and  Haiti  have  a  comparable
commitment  to  education  and  that  this commitment  is reflected  in  roughly
comparable output indicators (gross primary enrollment rates of 78 percent of the
age group in Haiti and 69 percent in Tanzania). This conclusion,  however, would
be  inaccurate.  Haiti's  education  sector  receives  almost  three  times  more
resources (as a  percentage of GDP)  than does Tanzania's, but with the  same
outcome, less equitably distributed, at the primary level.  Thus, when all inputs
are taken into account, the Tanzanian situaiicn still reflects acute underfinancing
of the sector, while the primary issue in Haiti is one of inefficient and inequitable
management of sector resources.
Sourc:  "Haiti: Public Expenditure Review,"  Report No. 6113-HA (September
26, 1986);  and 'Tanzania: Public Expenditure Review,"  Report No. 7559-TA  (May
22, 1989).
25Box 111:  Calculating  a Multiresource  Budget  for Education Spending
In 1986/87, Rwanda committed about 23 percent of capital and recurrent
public  expenditure--about 3  percent  of  GDP--to  public  ed.;ation.  Central
government recurrent  spending represented  about  80 percent  of total  sector
financing.  Financing varied substantially by level of education.  Municipalities
(local government) contributed only to primary and vocational education; foreign
donors supported only secondary education and university. The contribution of
parents increased with the level of education, then dropped to 0 percent at the
university level.  Only vocational schools and the university had minor amounts
of self-financing.
Level of Education
aimarYVocational  Secondarv  Un versitaigW
Financing Source
Central governner.t  84.3%  75.8%  74.0%  92.0%  82.4%
Municipalities  5.5  4.0  ---  ---  3.9
Self-financing  ---  2.3  ---  1.9  0.4
Parents  10.2  17.9  20.2  ---  11.8
Foreign cooperation  ---  ---  5.8  6.2  1.6
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%
Public spending/student  50  191  611  4,258 ($US)
Total unit cost/student  59  253  825  4,630 ($US)
al985/86
Source:  "Rwanda: Rapport  sur  le  cofit et  financement  de  l'enseignement
primaire, secondaire et superieur," Report No. 7362-RW (1989).
The variation in the degree of public subsidization (government spending
as  a  percentage  of  total  spending) demonstrates  clearly the  importance  of
determining and including all major financing sources, although these may vary
substantially from country to country, in any comprehensive sector expenditure.
analysis. Since the composition of non-central-government  spending on education
also  varies  greatly bv  level of  education,  analyses of  intrasectoral  resource
allocation that are based only on central govermnent expenditure may seriously
misrepresent the commitment of national resources to each level of education.
26C.  The Intrasectoral Allocation of Budgetary Resources
3.18  Intrasectoral  resource allocation issues are  identified in 27 of the 36 reports,
leaving 9 reports without diagnosis in this area.  Most reports state that current allocations
benefit higher education at the expense of primary or basic education.
3.19  There is greater unanimity on excessive  public funding of higher education (23
reports) than on underfunding of primary education (17 reports).  Some reports describe
other levels or areas of the education system as overfunded or underfunded.  Nine reports
consider that the secondary level is receiving an inordinate share of the education budget,
and two reports  (Bangladesh, Rwanda) judge the allocation to vocational training to be
excessive.  Underfunding of vocational education is noted  in five reports; of secondary
education,  one  report  (C6te  d'Ivoire); and  of higher education,  one  report  (Turkey).
Regarding government underfunding of vocational training, four of the five cases relate to
countries with a low level of sector resource mobilization (Guinea, Niger, Turkey, and the
Philippines).
3.20  In most cases, a statement that too little is spent at the primary level (or other
level) is accompanied by a statement on the subsector (predominantly higher education)
that receives too much.  However, there are also quite a number of "partial" assessments
--that  is,  of  a  subsector  receiving proportionally too  much  without  a  corresponding
indication of which subsector suffers most from this misallocation, or vice-versa.
3.21  As might be expected, the assessment of the intrasectoral allocation of public
resources with regard to the trade-off between primary and higher education is strongly
related to the primary enrollment rate of the respective countries (see table III.2).  Thus,
71 percent  of the  reports  covering low PE countries consider budgetary allocations to
primary education insufficient, compared with only 26 percent of the reports for high PE
countries: the  tendency is identical with  respect  to  higher education.  The  only two
exceptions to this pattern among the 17 low PE countries (Sierra Leone, Jordan) are reports
that do not take a position on this issue at all; on the other hand, among the 19 high PE
countries, 5 (Madagascar,  Zambia, Turkey, Lesotho, Honduras) explicitly  consider resource
allocation to primary education to be insufficient.
3.22  The pattern of PER evaluations of the relative allocation of public resources to
primary and higher education bears a much weaker relationship with overall sector resource
mobilization (SRM) than with the primary enrollment rate.  Concern for the issues at hand
is somewhat stronger, however, in high SRM countries than in low ones.  Consistently, the
hignest proportion (90 percent) of reports with explicit reference to an excessive  allocation
of public resources to  postprimary education is among the  category of  countries that
combine a comparatively high SRM with a low PE, which indicates inefficiencies in the
management and intrasectoral distribution of sector resources.
3.23  Five of the  nine reports  that  do not  take a  position on this issue are  from
coLntries that combine a low SRM1  with a high PE, that is, countries where sector financing
between public and private sources at the primary level may be distributed inequitably
(Cameroon, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Colombia).
27Table M2:  Intrasectoral  Allocaion of Sector  Resources
(Percentage of reports in each category)
Insufficient  Excessive
Allocation to  Allocation to
Primary  Higher  No
Country Groupings  Education  Education  Assessment
Low PE (17)  71  77  12
High PE (19)  26  53  37
Low SRM (20)  40  60  30
High SRM (16)  56  69  19
Total (36)  47  64  25
Note:  Parantheses indicate the number of reports in each category.
3.24  Judgments  in  the  reports  about  the  allocative  equity  and  efficiency of
government spending on  the  respective levels of education are  based  on two types of
criteria:  (i) the distribution of the sector budget (recurrent, capital, or total) relative to the
corresponding distribution of student enrollments among the various education levels; (ii)
the ratio of public expenditures per student at the various levels to unit expenditures at the
primary level, or to per capita GNP.  In both approaches, regional comparisons sometimes
complement the analysis. Neither approach explicitly  considers internal efficiency  or quality
differences between the various levels and types of education.  As a result, assessments of
the  adequacy of the intrasectoral allocation of the education budget, even though well-
intentioned and seemingly rational, all reflect a varying degree of arbitrariness.
3.25  As an example of the first approach, both the Burkina Faso and the Senegal
reports consider the intrasectoral allocation of public resources skewed in favor of higher
education.  Burkina Faso allocates 32 percent of its education budget to higher education;
Senegal,  only 19 percent.  But higher education serves about 1.5 percent of the total student
population  in  Burkina Faso, and  close to  2  percent of it in  Senegal.  Both countries
combine a high degree of sector resource mobilization  with a low primary enrollment rate.
Whereas the diagnosis of a misallocation  of sector resources may appear intuitively  credible
in the case of Burkina Faso, it is less so for Senegal, where the overriding issue might be
the inefficient use of resources at all education levels.
3.26  A few of the  reports appeared to  advocate reallocating resources to primary
education solely because of the distribution of the education budget, not because of the
corresponding  distribution  of  enrollments.  Among the  countries  advocating  such  a
28reallocation, the share of primary education in the recurrent sector budget varies between
33 percent and  69 percent.  These examples illustrate the  inherent weaknesses of the
approach.  The fact is that there are few operationally meaningful comparative standards,
at least at such an aggregate level of analysis.
3.27  In  the  second approach,  the  analysis is  in  principle more  refined,  and  its
outcome  potentially  more  credible,  since it  focuses directly  on  the  beneficiaries  of
government spending. Even then, however, most reports remain essentially  concerned with
expenditures per student at the different educational levels, rather than focusing  on actual
unit  outlays for basic  educational  necessities, and  on  the  extent  to  which minimum
requirements are  being satisfiedY  Again. comparing PER assessments across countries
provides a striking picture of the lack of credible comparative standards in the sector (see
table 111.3). According to  the PERs for which unit expenditure data are available on a
more or less comparable basis (16), the ratio of unit expenditures in higher education to
unit expenditures in primary education ranges between 6 (Philippines) and 208 (Tanzania)Y
For  most countries represented  in this range, PERs conclude that spending on primary
education is insufficient; yet public expenditures per primary student for these countries
ranges  from a  low US$14 (Zambia)  to  as  much as US$142 (C6te  d'Ivoire).  Clearly,
comparison  of  expenditures  per  graduate,  rather  than  per  student,  would  be  more
meaningful.
3.28  A more fundamental problem with calculations  of unit expenditures per student
or graduate is that recurrent government spending on education is almost exclusively  wages
and salaries for teaching and nonteaching personnel.  Teachers￿  incomes are  inherently
noncomparable across countries, and even within a country's civil service wage structure,
because of the large variation in educational requirements, opportunities to earn outside
income, teaching load, teaching hours, and so on.  More useful tools for crosscountry
comparisons would be  the  ratio  of  costs per  graduate  to  GNP  per  capita, nonsalary
expenditures per graduate (or even per student) on materials and supplies, or the ratio of
nonsalary to salary expenditures per unit of output (graduate or student).  Indeed, the Bank
has recently recommended increasing  nonsalary recurrent expenditures by US$5 per student
in low-income  countries and US$4 per student in lower-middle-income  countries. Research
has shown that  investment in quality-enhancing inputs boosts student learning and  can
reduce dropout and repeater  rates, thereby yielding significant  cost savings.￿- 1
￿-"Satisfaction of minimum educational input requirements is actually being assessed, or
touched upon. in many reports with respect to primary education. but very seldom for the
higher levels.  The assessment thus does  not  play an  integral role in  the  analysis of
intrasectoral allocation issues.
￿'Most  reports refer to 'unit costs,"  which may or may not cover private costs, capital costs,
or both.  In fact, in most cases, unit costs appear to be limited to government recurrent
expenditure (often budgeted rather than actual).
6-1Marlaine  E.  Lockeheed  and Adriaan  M. Verspoor, Improving Primary  Education in
Developing Countries, The World Bank. 1990, p￿  122-3 (draft).
29Table 1113: Public Recuent  E  nditures per Student in Primary
and Higlher  Education
Primary  Higher  Ratio of Higher to:
Country  Year  US$  US$  Primary  GNP per capita
Botswana  (84)  97  4,887  50  4.7
Burkina Faso  (85)  43  1,989  46  10.5
Costa Rica  (86)  134  1,435  11  .9
Cote d'Ivoire  (85)  142  3,703  28  5.0
Ghana  (85)  38  3,095  81  7.9
Lesotho  (86)  23  3,527  153  9.5
Mali  (88)  65  1,161  18  5.5
Niger  (86)  104  2,412  23  9.3
Nigeria  (85)  73  4,834  66  13.1
Pakistan  (84)  24  184  8  .5
Philippines  (86)  44  258  6  .4
Rwanda  (86)  52  4,458  86  14.9
Tanzania  (86)  18  3,740  208  20.8
Turkey  (84)  49  609  12  .5
Zambia  (86)  14  2,162  154  8.6
Zimbabwe  (85)  93  2,391  26  4.1
Note:  In principle, the numbers in this table represent recurrent govermnent
expenditures per student in public institutions (see footnote 2).
3.29  In  some  cases, reports  also  base  their  judgment  on  recent  trends  in  the
distributional pattern of government education expenditures. Thus, an increase in the share
of higher education in the sector budget at the expense of primary education is taken as
further evidence of a misallocation of public resources. However, just as a decline in civil
service  wages  relative  to  the  price  of  nonpersonnel  expenditures  may  lead  to  a
nondiscriminatory reduction in the share of education in total expenditures (see box III.1),
the same tendency also holds with respect to intrasectoral resource distribution. A decline
in wages will therefore tend to raise the share allocated to higher education, a material-
intensive and capital-intensive subsector, and to lower the share to primary education, the
most labor-intensive subsector.
3.30  Evidently, no single indicator suffices in  providing a valid assessment of the
"appropriateness" of the intrasectoral distribution of government education expenditures.
Unless sector output goals are clearly defined, and process efficiency analyzed,  judgments
remain at best tentative.
30D.  Management of Sector Resources
3.31  All  reports  except  two  (Mexico, Zimbabwe)  refer  to  inefficiencies in  the
management of sector resources that impair the cost-effectiveness  of the education system.
Three  types of wastage are  encountered:  (i) imbalances in  the  distribution of sector
resources among various expenditure categories; (ii) low  internal efficiency,  largely reflected
in low student promotion and retention rates and suboptimal student/teacher  ratios; and
(iii) low external efficiency, reflected in poor labor market outcomes for graduates.  The
first two factors tend to raise operating costs per student or per  graduate, reducing the
educational outcome obtainable for a given level of sector resources, while the third reduces
the economic returns from educational investments.
3.32  Internal and external efficiency have been addressed in the context of sector
priorities (chapter II. E.), and the lack of integration between these two sets of issues and
the analysis  of sector costs and financing  has been observod in the preceding sections of this
chapter.  This section focuses on the  first, more narrowly der  Ad  category of resource
management issues.  It will review in particular the treatment ot recurrent versus capital
expenditures, and of personnel versus nonpersonnel expenditures.
3.33  Recurrent versus capital expenditures.  Seven reports cover only the recurrent
or only the capital budget.  With one exception, all these reports were published before
1988.  All the others cover both budgets, although the depth  of analysis varies greatly.
Broadly speaking, 23 reports compare the share of the sector budget allocated to recurrent
and capital expenditures. Among these, the share of recurrent expenditures varies between
wide margins (55 percent to 99 percent).
3.34  Definitions and coverage vary greatly.  Capital expenditures are found under
the heading of the capital, development, or investment budget.  More importantly, these
budgets may or may not include foreign financing; reports do not always make this clear.
In most cases, nonrecurrent budgets include some de facto recurrent outlays. Few reports
analyze the  details  of these  budgets to  identify "true" capital outlays, and, within that
category, the part of investment in capacitv expansion versus capacity rehabilitation.  The
capital costs generated  by the  absence  of maintenance  and  repair  of  equipment  and
facilities (that is, by the shortage of recurrent funding) thus receive little attention.
3.35  Nine reports conclude that capital investinent needs are underfunded.  Five of
these state only that the part of sector resources allocated to capital expenditures is small
or declining (Bolivia,  Costa Rica, Peru, Kenya, Mali); another three recommend increasing
the level, though not necessarily the share, of capital expenditures (Colombia, Guatemala,
Turkey). The Madagascar report advises increasing  capital investment in primary education
through reallocation of resources from secondary and higher levels.
3.36  Ideally, in a PER context, one might expect an analysis of the sector investment
program  and  its  recurrent  cost  implications or,  in  a  more  normative  approach,  the
identification of a "core" investment program, the recurrent cost implications of which can
be met from the projected increase in sector resources.  Fourteen reports, including eight
multisector PERs, do not cover the  sector investment program at all.  Thirteen  reports
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these, however, address the recurrent cost impiications. Only nine reports define a specific
core  investment  program  or  recommend  cutting  the  governrment program  to  bring
incremental recurrent costs within sustainable limits.
3.37  As is well known, the education sector has extremely high recurrent/capital cost
ratios. For most countries undergoing fiscal stabilization and economic restructuring, sector
resource constraints are  a major impediment to  expanding access to education, largely
because the operating cost of simply maintaining current enrollment capacity, not to speak
of quality, has gradually eroded  all domestic resources previously available for capital
investment.  For  the  same  reason,  foreign support  for  capital  investment  has  been
stagnating, except where donors have agreed to provide additional financing for recurrent
costs.  Where  confined to  capital investment, foreign aid  has generated  incremental
recurrent  costs that exceed domestic financing, resulting in underused or unraintained
facilities, or it has concentrated on the rehabilitation of facilities and equipment.
3.38  Regardless of the  level of sector resources, imbalances between capital and
recurrent expenditures compromise the efficiency  of resource management and the effective
mobilization of external financial commitments. The sustainability of past achievements is
threatened, and future development is jeopardized. Under these circumstances,  the cursory
attention devoted in many education PERs to the appropriate balance between capital and
recurrent expenditures is worrisome.
3.39  About two-thirds of those reports that  emphasize trade-offs between capital
and recurrent expenditures are concentrated in low SRM/high PE countries, where the
burden of maintaining a high level of sector activity  under global resource constraints tends
to sharpen such trade-ofifs. When resources are limited but the need for them is growing,
there is intense pressure to increase internal efficiency. Allocative inefficiencies--such  as
large capital expenditure program. (for example, for school construction in response to
growing numbers  of  school entrants)  with  insufficient allocations for  operations  and
maintenance--become more  costly.  Examples of good practice  in this context are  the
Malawi, Rwanda,  and  Haiti  reports;  only Malawi and  Rwanda  apply the  concept of
recurrent/capital cost ratios (see box III.4).
3.40  Personnel versus nonpersonnel expenditures.  Two-thirds of the reports (again
concentrated in countries with a low level of sector resource mobilization, but a high sector
output) express concern about the distribution of personnel and nonpersonnel expenditures
in the recurrent budget.  All of these reports mention insufficient spending on educational
materials and supplies as an issue affecting the quality of education, but only half provide
actual figures.  The usefulness of this information for comparative purposes has already
been noted (para. 3.28). Fifteen reports mention insufficient spending on maintenance of
education facilities (4 with underlying data).
3.41  Teachers' salaries. Concern about teachers' salaries is highest in countries with
the opposite set of indicators:  a high ratio of education spending to GDP but poor output.
This combination indicates inefficient  resource use, and the largest component of education
spending is wages. It is, however, extremely  difficult and probably not useful to generalize
32further about the treatment of sectoral versus government-wide  wage structures in PERs.
The salaries of primary teachers vary greatly as do the requirements, such as number of
teaching hours and  students per  teacher.  Many reports use available data  to estimate
either a time trend of real income for teachers, or a static or dynamic measure of income
to per capita GNP.
3.42  Although personnel costs generally  absorb too much of the recurrent budget, 10
of the 15 reports that explicitly  refer to teachers' salaries recommend increasing  them. Only
eight reports cite actual figures for teachers' salaries.
3.43  Links  between  staffing and  remuneration  issues  and  the  macroeconomic
perspective are weak or nonexistent in most reports.  There are a few exceptions.  The
following  countries recommend  policies  that would  raise salaries wiL.. 1 out increasing  spending
in  the  face  of  macroeconomic constraints:  Bolivia and  Haiti,  by  eliminating ghost
employees and redundant positions; Ghana, by raising student/teacher ratios; and Lesotho,
by implementing a wide range of cost-efficient  measures at the university level. Otherwise,
5 of the 10 reports that recommend higher salaries for teachers make no comment about
the feasibility of the proposal given the overall budget situation.  Moreover, two of these
(Costa Rica and Cameroon) also contain global recommendations about tight control of
public sector wages as a means of reducing recurrent expenditures.
3.44  Few reports analyze changes in teachers' wages in the context of the civil service
wage and employment structure.  One exception is the  Kenya PER,  which states that
because 40 percent of Kenya's civil service are teachers, the proposed elimination of the
government's guarantee of employment for all university  and teacher training graduates will
not have a sector-neutral impact (see box 111.1).  It will have a disproportionately large (and
positive) effect on the skilled-labor-intensive  education sector, raising the student/teacher
ratio  above  its present  level and  facilitating the  transfer  of resources  from wages to
materials expenditures.
3.45  There is tremendous variation in the coverage of economic forces and policy
choices that  affect education.  A particularly critical area  is wage and  incomes policy.
Adjustments to teachers' salaries relative to those of other civil servants must be addressed
with regard to the macroeconomic constraints. Likewise,  the consequences of adjustments
in the civil service wage structure must be analyzed at the sectoral level. Analysis  of budget
items providing  information on macro/sector links and assessment  of outcomes for proposed
reforms vary  greatly  among reports,  often  reflecting data  availability and  budgetary
transparency.  All of these areas need to be strengthened.  The first best solution is to
allocate Bank resources to ex ante sector work that could provide the data rather than to
PERs that are forced to finesse this critical link.
33Box  1A4: Balaning Investment  and Recurrent  Spending:
R,cure,nt/Capital Cost Ratios in MalawNi  and Rwanda
Throughout thle  developing world the productivity  of investment programs
has been jeopardized by the  failure of governrments  to provide adequately for
their operation and maintenance over time.  "R" coeffic-ents,  equal to the ratio
of incremental recurrent expenditures required by investment expenditures to
total investment expenditures, can be a useful tool in predicting recurrent cost
needs and evaluating the adequacy of recurrent expend,tures historically.
The Rwanda PER estimates "r" coefficients  for education projects in order
to predict recurrent costs of the planned investment in various levels of education.
The  following conclusions emerge:  (i) the  primary education "r" coefficient
compares favorably with those for similar countries;tJ (ii) when recurrent costs
are estimated in the requests, they are noticeably underestimated; and (iii) the
future demand on budgetary resources by each level of education will far exceed
resources, as well as the financial capacity of the sector.
Malawian authorities estimated "r" coefficients for education subsectors,
based on projected recurrent costs of individual investment projects:
Primary schools  0.18  Teachers' Training College  0.06
Secondary schools  0.13  Distance Education  0.06
The weighted average of the coefficients  (0.12) is much greater than the sector's
"r" coefficient  derived from actual spending during the 1983/84 to 1987/88  period
(0.03).  The discrepancy between projected and actual "r" coefficients indicates
acute  underfunding  of  recurrent  costs necessary to  service education  sector
investments (4 MK million spent versus 15 MK million required).
The magnitude of recurrent costs associated with projects tends to differ
greatly across sectors as well as subsectors.  Nevertheless, "r" coefficients can
provide essential  information on  the  recurrent  cost implications of proposed
investment  spending.
a;'Education  sector "r" coefficients  for a restricted sample of developing countries
are reported in Peter  Heller, "The Underfinancing of Recurrent Development
Costs,"  in Finance and Development, March 1979.
Slrcg.s:  "'alawi:  Public Expenditure Review,"  Report No. 7281-MAI  (February
10, 1989); and  "Rwanda:  Public Expenditure  Program:  An  Instrument  of
1j,  oomc  Strategv,' Report No. 7717-RW (October 19, 1989).
34IV.  SECrOR FINANCING  STRATEGIES
4.01  This  section  reviews the  explicit and  implicit sector  financing strategies  in
education PERs.  The inherent logic of these strategies is assessed through comparative
analysis on the basis of the country typology,  taking into account the  macro and sector
situation.  Macro and sector diagnoses and strategies are, by necessity,  highly synthesized.
The  macroeconomic  situation--growth in  general  and  public  finance  in  particular--is
diagnosed as improving,  stable, or deteriorating (see figure 11.1). Sector financing diagnoses
and strategies relate  to the overall allocation of government resources to education, the
distribution of  these resources among subsectors, and the  efficiency of sector resource
management.  All the outcomes of this comparative analysis, selectively reported in this
chapter, are included in annex IV.  Sector strategies by country typology  are presented in
figure IV.1.
Figure IV.1:  Sector Financing  Strategies
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4.02  Eighteen countries are advised to increase government spending on education.
In all but three reports, the sector is explicitly  diagnosed as underfinanced. In nine reports,
35the  recommendation relates  to  the  amount of the  government budget allocated to  the
sector;  only the Turkey report specifies from where the reallocation is to come.  In four
cases, the recommendation is for an increase in sector expenditures relative to GNP, thus
implicitly  safeguarding the desired outcome against deterioration in the efficiency  of overall
public resource mobilization.  In the remaining five cases, the report simply advocates an
increase in real expenditures on education, and the outcome in terms of the intersectoral
allocation of public resources remains undetermined.
4.03  In  eight of these  eighteen countries, the economic situation is described as
improving, hence facilitating the implementation of the recommendation; the economy is
considered stable in another five countries. The Cameroon, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, and
Peru reports advocate increasing public spending on education even though the country is
facing difficult times.  In Peru, the increase is considered essential "for social and political
reasons" for the attainment of other development goals, and the report states clearly which
sectors should be targeted for reallocations. The Nigeria report finds that the quality and
equity of education and the condition of the physical plant have deteriorated so much that
increased public spending on education is essential in spite of resource constraints.  In all
18 countries, new sources of financing or cos: recovery measures are recommended.
4.04  When grouped by the country typology (see table IV.1), 15 of the 18 countries
for which increased government spending on education is recommended indeed have a low
rate  of sector  resource mobilization, representing three-fourths of all countries in  that
category.  For the remaining five low SRM countries, PERs recommend maintaining the
relative level of government spending.
Table IV.1:  Sector Financing  Strategies:  Public Resource Allocation
(Percentage of reports in each category of countries)
Country  Maintain Status Quo/
Category  Increase Allocation  No Recommendation
Low SRM (20)  75  25
High SRM (16)  19  81
Low PE (17)  47  53
High PE (19)  53  47
Total (36)  50  50
Note:  Parantheses indicate the number of reports in each category.
364.05  In six of the low SRM countries for which increased govermment  spending is
advocated  (Cameroon,  Guinea,  Malawi,  Mozambique,  Nigeia,  and  Turkey),  sector
resources are constrained by a relatively low budget allocation.  In another three countries
(Guatemala, Colombia, Peru), public resource allocation to  the  sector is high, and the
constraint lies in the low level of public resource mobilization. In the remaining countries
(Bolivia,  Haiti, Mexico,  Pakistan, Bangladesh,  Sierra Leone), both factors combined depress
the sector resource situation.
4.06  The pattern  of PER recommendations for increased government spending on
education  appears  to  be  unrelated  to  the  primary  enrollment  rate.  Positive
recommendations are made for 53 percent of the high PE and for 47 percent of the low PE
countries.  The highest proportion of positive recommendations is recorded for the low
SRM/low  PE subcategory (86 percent),  followed by the  low SRM/high  PE group (69
percent).  In countries where public resources for education are  relatively low and  the
primary enrollment  rate  is high, sustainability of the  sector  activity and equity in  the
distribution of its cost burden may require a higher level of government financing.
4.07  None  of  the  reports  recommends a  reduction  in  the  level  of government
spending on education, not even for high SRM countries. Thirteen of the sixteen countries
in this category recommend maintaining that level, or they do not commit themselves on
this particular issue.  In only three high SRM cases (Costa Rica, Ghana, Lesotho) is an
increase in government spending recommended.  Lesotho's SRM position reflects a high
level of public resource mobilization (22 percent) rather than of sector resource allocation
(16 percent),  whereas  Ghana's  situation  is  the  opposite  (15 percent  and  24  percent
respectively). While increased spending seems feasible in Lesotho, it may be a response
to high demand for secondary education since the country already has universal primary
education.  In Ghana, increased spending on education is understandable in view of the
sector's low primary coverage, but it may not be sustainable.
4.08  Most of the countries that advocate no change in education expenditures have
a high level of sector resource mobilization (13 of the 16 reports in the high SRM category
compared with 5 of 20 reports in the low SRM category).  A tendency to maintain the
status quo thus prevails when sector resources are relatively abundant.  Even though this
tendency is natural from a sector perspective, it may merit closer scrutiny irn  some cases.
4.09  The  PER  for  C6te  d'Ivoire  acknowledges that  education's  share  of  the
government's recurrent budget is among the highest in the world (42 percent in 1985),  but
it fails to  formulate a spending recommendation even though the  economic and public
finance situations are described as deteriorating.  The report does advocate various cost-
saving and recovery measures, all of which will benefit primary education, which has a low
enrollment rate, rather than the general budget.  Zambia, on the other hand, has a rather
low budget allocation to  the  sector  (8.3 percent)  and  an  economy that  apparently is
l/Nigeria, though highly indebted, is not strictly speaking a low SRM country if education
financing by the states is added to the federal sector budget.
37improving, yet  the  PER  does  not  explicitly favor increased  government  spending on
education.
B.  The Intrasectoral Allocation of Government Resources
4.10  Most reports recomrnend changes in the intrasectoral allocation of government
expenditures--usually  more money for primary education.  Reports advocate either direct
redistribution or cost recovery measures at the postprimary (mainly postsecondary) level.
Restrictions  on  the  growth  of  postprimrary, principally  university,  enrollments  are
recommended in 11 reports.  Cost recovery  is to be achieved by introducing or raising user
fees (20 cases) and,  to  a  lesser extent, by reducing subsidies (13 cases).  Five reports
explicitly  indicate that the proceeds of the cost recovery  measures should be reallocated to
primary education.  In most other cases, one has to assume that these proceeds remain in
the subsector, hence that redistribution is indirect.
4.11  Consistent with the desire to alter the distribution of public expenditures in favor
of primary education, none of the reports advocates cost recovery at that level.  Many
reports, however, recommend that additional sources of primary education financing be
identified and exploited. Expansion of the private school system (proprietary or sponsored
by a nongovernmental organization) is encouraged in 17 reports, and contributiors solicited
from local communities and parent associations,  mainly for primary school construction and
maintenance, are proposed in 6 reports.  The Nigeria report advocates the imposition of
a development levy on households for the financing of primary education.
4.12  Although not directly related to the intrasectoral distribution of the education
budget, such measures have an indirect redistributive effect on it.  Whether this effect is
consistent with the underlying intrasectoral reallocation philosophy remains, in most cases,
an  unanswered  question.  This  omission  may  be  of  particular  concern  where  the
recommended  measures  amount  to  de  facto  prirmary cost  recovery, such  as  direct
contributions from communities and parents.
4.13  Recommendations usually are made after the equity of the distribution of sector
resources  has been  assessed.  In  seven cases, however, cost recovery or  reallocation
measures are advocated without a clear prior assessment of the situation.  PER emphasis
on intrasectoral reallocation strategies is understandably stronger in low PE countries than
in  high PE countries, but  it does not  seem to  bear  much relationship to  the  sector's
resource  situation.  Quite  consistently, however, high  SRM/low  PE  countries  favor
reallocation.  The imbalance between the supply of public resources to the sector and the
primary enrollment rate calls for increased attention to intrasectoral allocations, both on
equity and efficiency grounds.
C.  Sector Resource Management
4.14  All together 30 PERs make concrete recommendations about sector resource
management.  Characteristicaily, four of six PERs  that do  not  take  a  stand on sector
resource management issues cover high SRM countries, two of which also have a relatively
low primary enrollment rate  (Central  African Republic, Costa  Rica).  Recommended
38strategies entail direct cost-saving  measures (for example, less costly teacher training, lower
teacher qualification standards, a shift of teachers from higher to lower education levels,
lower school construction costs) or indirect savings through efficiency improvements (for
example, more intensive use of teachers and facilities and higher student promotion rates).
4.15  Few  of  the  reports  acknowledge that  increased  efficiency of  educational
processes usually requires prior investment in quality improvements, the incremental costs
of which initially outweigh the resulting savings. Furthermore, it is often unclear from the
recommended  efficiency measures whether  realized  savings are  to  remain  within the
subsector or to be reallocated to another subsector.  Consequently, the ultimate effect of
such  measures  on  the  intrasectoral  distribution  of  the  education  budget  remains
undetermined, even though the equity of this distribution is a stated area of concern.
D.  Overall Assessment
4.16  With a few exceptions, the financing  strategies emerging from PERs are rooted
in an explicit, though sometimes equivocal, sector diagnosis. As far as the overall level of
government spending on education is concerned, recommendations  are not always  consistent
with the global economic assessment.
4.17  Many PERs  fail to  follow up  on  the  sector  diagnosis with concrete  policy
options. This "non-commitment"  phenomenon is concentrated in countries that spend quite
a lot on education. Countries with a comparatively  low  level of sector resource mobilization
favor  strategies  to  reallocate  resources  and  to  improve  the  efficiency of  resource
management.
4.18  The logic of this difference between high and low SRM countries is evident: the
more severe the sector resource constraints, the greater the need to find ways to do more
with available resources and  to tap  new sources of financing (including cost recovery).
But the implicit corollary--namely  that efficiency and equity of resource use deserve less
attention  in countries with more generously endowed education sectors--is less evident.
There seems to be an assumption that the share of education in the total budget i- more
or less fixed, or  at least is much more rigid than is the structure of the sector budget.
Without  much  justification,  the  focus  is  cn  intrasectoral  rather  than  intersectoral
reallocations of resources.
4.19  The  recommendations  in  PERs  for  increased  resource  allocations to  the
education sector or to a subsector are incomplete without a clear and realistic analysis of
the source of these resources.  If intrasectoral or intersectoral reallocations are proposed,
the PER should justify the transfer of resources within or to the education sector relative
to other sectors or subsectors.
4.20  Crosscountry analysis confirms the need for a country typology linking sector
financing and output criteria.  The crude typology  adopted for this review proved useful in
identifying exceptions and borderline cases that deserve closer scrutiny.  Two subsidiary
conclusions emerge from the use of this typology in the present context:
39(a)  Sector financing  issues and related strategies are relatively  obvious  in
countries  where the level of public  spending  on education  and the sector output
are both high or both low. Issues  and strategies  are more complex  when  there
is an  imbalance between the  two criteria (for example, a  high level of
government  funding  and low sector output).  In these cases, the interrelated
issues  of quality,  efficiency,  and equity  become  predominant.
(b) When  assessing  the adequacy  of the government's  financial  commitment  to
education, it is useful to distinguish  between the effect emanating  from the
relative size of the public budget and the proportional allocation of these
resources  to the sector. Where the first factor is the overriding  constraint  on
the supply  of resources,  the feasibility  and sustainability  of the views  held in a
number  of PERs seem  questionable,  at least in the absence  of a more integrated
treatment within  the macroeconomic  framework.
40V.  METHODOLOGY
5.01  The education sector is widely recognized as critical for development.  It also
consumes a large share of government fecurrent expenditures. Therefore, any unevenness
of analysis or imbalance in recommended strategies among sectors in PERs is a cause for
concern.  This section reviews the comprehensiveness of sector coverage, the information
and methodology incorporated into the sector analysis, and institutional issues.
A.  Sector Coverage
5.02  Prior  sector  experience.  All but  10 reports  (all of them  multisector) refer
specifically to  the participation of an education sector specialist on the PER mission(s).
Only 56 percent of the reports  state that they are building upon Bank experience in the
country; and most of these refer to previous Bank studies or other public expenditure or
education sector studies. The other reports do not place themselves explicitly  in the context
of prior CESW by the Bank.
5.03  Comprehensiveness  of sector coverage. All of the single-sector and two-thirds
of the multisector reports cover the entire formal education system,  although the emphasis
varies.  For  example, the Bolivia report  concentrates on the  primary level,  '  Tunisia
report on the primary and secondary levels,  and the Colombia report on primary and higher
educationY 1 Vocational and technical training was mentioned in two-thirds of the reports,
including all but one of the single-sector reviews.
5.04  Data.  All reports except that of the Central African Republic use government
data sources, and 28 use Bank-generated data.  The Bank data are commonly  presented as
an addendum or corrective to incomplete or inexact country-generated statistics.  In some
cases (for  example, Niger),  Bank spending  estimates differ  from government  budget
estimates because of different methods of measuring costs. In other cases, exact estimates
are impossible because of ambiguities. In Mozambique, many foreign-financed  education
projects are not in the budget, and in Pakistan, the extent of federal and provincial cost-
sharing is unclear.  Several reports  point  to  inconsistencies in  government data.  For
example, the  statistics from  one  ministry contradict  those  of  another,  or  subsector
expenditures do not add up to the sector total.  Half of the reports refer to necessary data
(particularly on the wage structure and on unit costs per student) that are not available.
5.05  Single-sector  versus multisector reports.  The 8 single-sector  and 28 multisector
reports in the sample are  only partially comparable because of their different emphases.
First, the single-sector reports include more complete data on education (enrollment and
repeater rates, unit cost data, breakdowns of information by level of education, and so on).
They also provide better analysis  of data--which data are inconsistent or missing,  and more
detailed information on how estimates are derived. Second,  they analyze sector issues and
priorities  in  more  detail  (specific inefficiencies by  level  of  education,  intrasectoral
!JReports that focused exclusively  on a single level were excluded from the review.
41allocations and misallocations).  Third, they more frequently include information on the
government's strategy for the sector.  When a sector financing model is used, the trade-
offs often reflect the government's explicit priorities. One problem area that is highlighted
much more consistently in single-sector reports  is the  insufficiency  of funds allocated to
materials and maintenance. This imbalance exemplifies  the type of budgetary underfunding
or misallocation that is often not apparent from the macro perspective. Fourth, the single-
sector reports cite a wider variety of objectives for the education sector.  Fifth, they often
discuss the  social consequences of education reforms.  Finally, single-sector reports  are
more often developed within a long-term (to year 2000) framework. Yet the detailed sector
work in single-sector reports is often presented in a macroeconomic near-vacuum.
5.06  Multisector  PERs  treat  more  thoroughly than  do  single-sector PERs  the
macroeconomic strategy, the effect of education reforms on the public budget, intersectoral
trade-offs,  dangers  to  the  sustainability of  reforms,  and  questions  of  political  and
institutional feasibility. More frequently than single-sector  PERs, they use Bank-generated
data rather than government data and government planning documents rather than actual
expenditures.  Because the PER is often a tool for the projection or analysis  of a medium-
term  expenditure  program,  the  multisector  reports  focus  on  reforms  that  can  be
implemented within three to five years. Multisector reports also tend to refer to underlying
sector studies or other  Bank experience in the  country.  Single-sector reports rarely do
because they usually precede any non-project involvement of the Bank in the sector, and
they reflect either the initial sector work or an update after a lapse of several years.
5.07  In  spite  of the  commonalities described earlier,  there  is great  diversity of
coverage among PERs.  Although the reports serve different purposes at different stages
of the Bank-country dialogue, greater standardization of coverage, format, data, and data
sources is advised.
B.  Coverage of Education Financing
5.08  A major problem for the analyst is not knowing  what portion of total education
financing is represented  by the public budget allocated to the relevant ministry.  Three
specific questions need to be answered:
a)  Are there significant nongovernment sources of education financing?
b) Are there significant  public sources of education financing that do not appear
in the central government's budget?
c)  Are there significant central government sources of education funding that
fall outside the line ministry?
5.09  Nongovernment sources of  education financing.  Reports  cite two types of
nongovernrent  funding of education:  private funding by beneficiaries (or their families),
businesses, NGOs, religious organizations, or other groups; and private or public financing
by foreign countries.  The role  of the  private  sector  in  the  financing of education  is
described in 60 percent of the countries reviewed. Twenty  reports describe private schools,
42most commonly at the primary and secondary levels.  Although most private schools are
operated  for profit, seven reports mention that nonprofit religious organizations provide
education.
5.10  Another form of private sector education funding is user fees, mentioned by
nearly half the reports.  Eight reports describe school fees levied for tertiary education.
School fees at lower levels of education are mentioned primarily for East Africa.  Kenya
and the Philippines charge fees at the secondary level, Nigeria and Zambia at the primary
and secondary levels, Rwanda and Tanzania at the primary level only, and Zimbabwe for
primary and  vocational schools.  Lesotho has  user  fees  for primary, secondarv, and
vocational education.  Ghana charges for textbooks and school materials at all levels, but
these fees are symbolic  rather than real because they recover only about 1 percent of actual
costs for materials.  African parents in particular contribute to their children's education
by providing school materials such as books and uniforms or by helping to build, maintain,
or operate school facilities.
5.11  A great deal of confusion about  the role and advisability of user fees exists.
Much of the confusion is the result of a partial equilibrium analysis that reflects a lack of
adequate data.  Information about the ability or willingness  of the administrative apparatus
to collect fees is often scarce.  Almost all reports that discuss  user fees mention the equity
and access implications--both  positive and negative--but they do not incorporate the sector
expert's intuitive assessments into a general equilibrium analysis of the budgetary trade-
off between user fees and scholarships, or the effect of cost recovery on the demand for
education, for example.  Although exceptions exist (see below under social and equity
issues),  the treatment  of user fees, while necessarily situation specific, leaves too much
room for subjective interpretations based upon largely insufficient data.
5.12  A final nongovernment source of financing is foreign aid.  Seventeen reports
describe foreign financing for education projects.  These reports  are  spread  across all
country groupings and report  categories.  Some reports cover foreign financing in detail,
others subsume it into central government spending. In general, donor assistance focuses
on the capital budget and provides little support for recurrent expenditures, except when
they are hidden in the investment program, even of donor-financed capital projects.
5.13  The treme.idous variation in the treatment of foreign aid to education is a result
of the different ways of treating it in the government budget.  The Mozambique report
notes that the country's investment budget includes considerable recurrent spending that is
foreign financed.  Recurrent expenditures are capitalized to attract donor support, which
is usually not offered for explicitly recurrent items.  But the report makes no attempt to
quantify or track these hidden recurrent costs or to calculate the degree to which the capital
and recurrent budgets are skewed by outside funding.
5.14  No expenditure items are cited for the foreign financing of education in Haiti,
where it provides 30 percent of total sectoral spending; in Bangladesh, where 23 percent
of primary, 6 percent of secondary, 54 percent of vocational, and 15 percent of university
spending is provided by foreign donors; or Rwanda, where 1.6 percent  of the  recurrent
budget is foreign financed.  No figures are given on foreign aid to education in Honduras,
43Mozambique, Niger, and Burkina Faso, although the reports mention that it is significant.
Little coherent analysis of this important item is possible unless all foreign inputs into the
capital and recurrent budgets are itemized.
5.15  Local government financing of education.  One-third of the  reports mention
local government financing of education.  Here again, the large disparities in the treatment
of the role of the local government in education are because of administrative or budgetary
opacity. It is not always  clear whether the local authorities are distinct revenue-generating
and decisionmaking bodies with regard to education, or whether they are merely recipients
and administrators of central govermnent pass-throughs. The role of local administrations
should be clarified.
5.16  Other central government financing of education. Twenty percent of all reports
cite  extrabudgetary spending as  a  result  of  balanced budget requirements,  off-budget
earmarked  funds, special foreign currency accounts, and  so on.  Eight reports  briefly
describe the role of government ministries other than the Ministry of Education in sector
financing. Vocational training, building construction, and maintenance are functions that
often  fall outside the  purview of the  Ministry of Education.  In  addition to budgetary
contributions from specific ministries,  education may be funded from other public financing
sources (see box V.1).  Too narrow a focus in the sector financing analysis may lead to
underestimation of the public resources allocated to the sector and to distortions i;a the
assessment of how they are distributed.
5.17  In general, vocational training programs are small, and the exclusion  of figures
for them in a functional education budget, while distorting, is not critical. The same cannot
be said for operations and main.enance costs. In many countries, it is difficult to determine
what  percentage  of  expenditures  by  the  public works  or  other  relevant  ministry is
functionally linked to education, and these amounts can be substantial.  In Guatemala,
most capital investment in education is financed by the Ministry  of Public Works; in Peru,
over half of all school construction is funded by the National Development Corporation.
5.18  In only a few countries does a functional budget appear to be readily available
or calculable, so some reports  have gone to great lengths to  approx 1mate these  costs.2/
Such efforts are  necessary because  the  relegation of  these largely capital costs to  the
budgets of other ministries clearly distorts the relationship between capital and recurrent
financing needs in the sector.  Increased attention to the development of functional, rather
than administrative, budgetary categories is suggested.
Z/Tanzania's PER  (1988),  for  example,  lists  recurrent  and  development  budgetary
expenditures  by  administrative  categories  (central  government  ministries)  and  by
crossministerial end-use  categories  (general  administration, public  safety,  sanitation,
education, and so on).  These categories are only partially comparable, and the creation of
a workable functional budget depends upon detailed knowledge of budgetary categories.
44Box V.1: The Education Budget in Mali
Mali's public budget has three main components: the national budget, the
regional budgets, and special accounts (budgets annexes).  The national budget,
in turn, has three  categories:  ministries; "general outlays"  (charges communes),
essentially subsidies and transfers; and equipment.  Capital expenditures figure
mainly  under  the  equipment  rubric, but  they are  included  in  some  of  the
ministerial budgets. The equipment budget also includes a substantial portion of
recurrent expenditures.
Education expenditures, defined as those related to the formal education
system managed by the Ministry  of Education, are scattered in several places.  It
takes careful detective work to determine the true size and composition of the
education sector budget.  More than 80 percent of primary education is financed
through the regional budgets. The "charges communes' rubric includes subsidies
to private schools, as well as local and foreign transportation costs incurred by
students, teachers, and Ministry  of Education officials. The following  table shows
how the sector's recurrent budget is pieced together.
1988 Public Recurrent  Expenditure on Education (FCFA mfi.)
Budgetary Source:
Ministry of  Charges  Regional
Subsector  Education  (@°!  Cornmunes  Budgets  3[otal  (To)
Primary Ed.  415  (3.2)  253  3,154  3,822 (21.6)
Secondary Ed.  8,347 (64.0)  649  --  8,996 (51.0)
Teacher Training  853  (6.5)  22  --  875  (5.0)
Higher Ed.  2,508 (19.3)  539  --  3,047 (17.2)
Administration  910f7.)  -- 7.  3  913  (5.2)
Total  13,033  (100.0)  1,463  3,157  17,653  (100.0)
Percentage of  (19.4)  (26.2)
Total Recurrent Budget
This example shows  how seriously  the government's financial commitment
to education may be underestimated if the analysis is limited to the budget of the
line ministry.  In Mali, the line ministry represents  19 percent of total  public
recurrent expenditure, whereas the comprehensive sector budget accounts for 26
percent.  More important, the sector budget shows a more rational intrasectoral
distribution of resources, even if heavily skewed against primary education.
Snurce:  Serge  Cuenin,  "Analyse  des  Depenses  Budgetaires  Relatives  a
I'Education", IREDU,  September 1989 (background paper for MALI Education
Sector Consolidation Project. IDA Cr. 2054-MLI).
45C.  Education Finance Models
5.19  Use  of  simulation models in  the  financial analysis of  the  sector  has  had
beneficial  results  in  terms  of  coherence,  comprehensiveness, and  interpretability of
outcomesY  Education finance models differ in structure and in sophistication.  They all
provide an accounting framework linking student flows,  and sometimes teacher flows,  to the
various components of unit costs (such as teachers' salaries, administration, materials and
supplies, maintenance).  They then project  sector financing requirements according to
various  assumptions  about  enrollment  rates,  efficiency  improvements,  cost-recovery
measures, or other reform targets. The "resource availability"  versior.  of the model is driven
by the budget constraint and solved for maximum feasible growth of student enrollments,
and the "resource requirement" version is driven by student enrollments and solved for the
required minimum sector budget.
5.20  Twelve reports use an education financing  simulation model. Characteristically,
use of this analytical tool appears to be frequent in single-sector  reports (five of the eight
reviewed), and  infrequent in multisector PERs (seven of twenty-eight).  It is also more
freq-.ent for countries with a lowv  level of sector resources (45 percent of the reports in that
category) than for high SRM countries (19 percent).  Five reports  rely on the  resource
availability  version of the model, another five on the resource requirement version.  The
iemaining  two reports use both versions, projecting a "sector financing gap"  that results
from the difference between sector priorities and available financing (the budget constraint).
Most of the  reports  present  alternative scenarios that  compare the  costs of continuing
current enrollment and internal efficiency  trends with the cost and allocative implications
of recommnended  policy measures.
5.21  In  the  PER  context, education  financing models  are  a  useful  tool  for
strengthening the policy  dialogue between the macroeconomist  and the sector specialist,  and
ultimately between them and the gcvernment.  More systematic use of this tool is greatly
encouraged. The development of education financing models requires considerable initial
investment in time and resources.  Therefore, they should be undertaken as part of prior
sector work.
D.  Structural and Institutional Issues
5.22  Planned versus actual expenditures. Twenty-five  reports include actual education
e,penditures  as well as government planning documents.  Nine reports cover only actual
spending, and two reports (Mozambique and Senegal) consider only planned expenditures.
Of the reports that compare planned and actual spending, half of them point to specific
discrepancies--usually  shortfalls.
5.23  The  most complete treatment  of this issue is in  the  Colombia PER, which
provides a  useful  picture  of  a  shortfall in  actual  expenditures on  education  directly
l/See, for example, Manuel Zymelman, Education Finance Simulation Model, World
Bank, 1987.
46attributable to the national budget (see box V.2). The Lesotho report also analyzes  the gap
between planned and actual investments in education and finds several causes, most of
which are  institutional/procedural:  overambitious targets, delays in  donor funding, and
weaknesses in project management.  Other reports (Honduras's, for example) note that
although overall expenditures have been below target, capital expenditures have exceeded
budget levels.  Inflation, cost overruns, and inaccurate forecasting are often cited for the
difference between target and actual spending.
5.24  The budget process.  All but six of the twenty-eight  multisector reports discuss
the  budget process, and those that do not often refer to  other country documents that
provide such analysis. Only two of the eight single-sector  reports discuss  the budget process,
and then only for the sector. The treatment of the budget process and its relevance to the
cost and financing review  varies tremendously. Some times the sector's budget is developed
by the regions and then aggregated, and at other times the entire government budget is
centr!-lly determined  on  an  incremental  basis--a  process  that  prevents  significant
intrasectoral or intersectoral adjustments. Box V.3 presents a brief sketch of good practice
in public expenditure planning in Botswana.
5.25  Some of the reports point to budget rigidities that make optimum allocations
impossibie.  In  Colombia, for example, an oki system of earmarked  taxes means that
resources cannot be transferred among budgetary categories according to new priorities.
In several African countries, all revenues go directly to the Treasury, so the Ministry of
Education has little  incentive to  collect mandated school fees.  In other  countries, an
apparently deliberate lack of transparency in budgeting facilitates a lack of accountability
for actual outlays and for results.
5.26  The most common budgetary problem is poor coordination of the capital and
recurrent budgets, resulting often in too much capital spending (on construction) relative
to  expenditures  on  supplies and  maintenance.  This  imbalance can  have  particularly
disastrous effects on the social sectors,  where spending is overwhelmingly  recurrent. About
half the reports suggest budgetary reforms (setting expenditure priorities that integrate the
budget with medium-term planning) to facilitate education sector reforms. In four countries
(Ghana, Guinea,  Kenya, and  Madagascar), major budget reforms are  under way.  The
principal objectives of Madagascar's 1988 budget reform are to increase the efficiency of
allocations; to  integrate the  Public Investment Program and  the  recurrent  budget in a
consolidated process; to improve budget presentation and coverage; and to strengthen and
streamline expenditure monitoring and execution procedures in order to imp!  Zve control
and accountability.
5.27  Social and equity issues. Sixty  percent of reports discuss the social implications
of proposed  reforms (figure V.1).  The  discussion almost always focuses on improving
equity  and  acce 5s  at  the  primary level.  The  percentage  of  reports  that  recommend
improvements in equity or access is lowest in countries where the sector is weil funded
(that is, high SRM countries).
47BOX V2:  The Budget Process in Colombia
In Colombia, the central govermnent has traditionally had little power
and  few  legal  or  institutional  mechanisms with  which  to  manage  public
expenditure.  The 1989  Colombia PER focuses on the budgetary process--why  i,
does  not  work  well  and  how to  gain  control  of  it.  After  addressing the
manageability of public expenditure and the earmarking of revenues, it discusses
the three  sectors (power, health, and education) that it finds require the most
attention.  It includes these sectors not only because they absorb large shares of
government spending, but also because the budget process itself has impeded
the implementation of the government's stated goals for the sector.
The annual budget process is criticized as a  short-term exercise with
little relationship to long-termn  planning.  Numerous rigidities--a constitutional
requirement that the budget not exceed the previous year's budget by more than
10 percent, a requirement that the budget be formally  balanced, and the extensive
system of earmarked  taxes--have contributed to the  budget's irrelevance as an
allocation and planning tool. As a result, planned income and expenditures often
have little relationship to actual financing and spending.
From  1986 to  1988, total  education  expenditures (both capital  and
recurrent) not only failed to meet the planned targets, but actually fell in real
terms.  Although investment in primary education doubled over the period, it fell
far short of the planned level, as did overall spending on primary education.  On
the  recurrent side, nonsalary spending fell 45 percent in real terms in spite of
government  recognition of  the  importance  of  nonsalary education  spending.
Since 91 percent of education financing comes from the central government (with
4 percent from external credits and 5 percent from all other sources), the large
shortfall in  education financing is directly attributable  to  central government
financing.  (In  1988, education  accounted  for  19.1 percent  of  the  central
government budget rather than the planned 24.6 percent.)
Although problems of fiscal planning and management remain, steps
have been taken to rationalize the process. The report reviews  these and suggests
additional procedural and institutional measures. It also links a) macroeconomic
and sectoral priorities with one another and with the institutional context, and b)
the budget process and the actual fiscal outcome.
jaj:  'Colombia  Public Expenditure Review," Report No. 7891-CO (green
cover).
48BOX V3:  Public Expenditure  Planning in Botswana
The analysis of Botswana's public expenditure plan in the  1986 PER  is
facilitated  by  a  strong national  accounts data  base  and  the  country's well-
developed  administrative  apparatus.  Preparation  of  the  sixth  National
Development Plan (1986-91)  began with the preparation of sector policy papers
by each ministry. These documents presented the ministry's  view on policy  issues
and on specific  problems within its purview. The papers were discussed by the
entire  Cabinet of  the  government, and  sectoral allocations of recurrent  and
development spending were made within the context of guidPlines for overall
expenditure growth.
Once the recurrent and capital expenditure ceilings  were fixed, ministries
were asked to prioritize objectives within the budget ceiling.  Spending on low
priority activities was maintained constant in real terms.  Departments providing
services to the public were allocated increased resources at least consistent with
the rate of population growth (3.7 percent).  High rates of spending growth were
determined for several sectors including education, reflecting the governrnent's
stated commitment to basic education and to alleviating the economic constraint
imposed by a lack of trained manpower. The recurrent cost implications of each
project  were  spelled  out,  as  were  the  recurrent  cost  implications of  each
ministry's investment program.  Ceilings on capital expenditure limit only those
projects  with  recurrent  cost  implications.  Other  self-liquidating  capital
expenditures were considered within the context of overall resource availability.
The  Plan  includes four  budget  scenarios, a  base  case  and  three  less
optimistic alternatives  that  are  designed to  test  whether  policy actions,  in
particular  new  revenue  measures,  would  be  needed  under  less  favorable
conditions. The Bank mission reviewed the scenarios and found that several of
the  assumptions of the base  case had become less plausible over time.  The
Bank presented a fifth scenario that is more optimistic than the country's most
favorable (base) scenario. The report, while commenting  favorably  on the budget
preparation  and  review  process,  makes  several  recommendations  for
improvement: the recurrent  cost implications of existing as well as proposed
investments should be  evaluated  and  justified; foreign assistance should be
itemized  by  project;  and  financing  for  parastatals  (even  nongovernmental
funding) should be indicated separately.
5.28  Several reports  recommend increased cost recovery but do  no  mention the
equity implications.  Much attention is paid, however, to a more equitable intrasectoral
distribution of  resources through greater  cost recovery (user  fees), proposed in  three-
quarters of all reports.  The reconimendations for cost recovery at the primary level vary:
some  reports  support  it,  while  others  suggest  its  elimination.  In  Haiti,  parental
49contributions  are a major burden on household  income, and costs rise throughout  the
primary  cycle. The Kenya  and Nigeria  reports argue that high  fees for primary  users  have
lowered  enrollment  among  the poor. But the Zambia report  advocates  the introduction  of
user fees.  It argues  that, given a spending  constraint,  modest charges  are less damaging
than are deteriorating  services. However,  if the user fees are not perceived  as the lesser
of two evils, parents may simply  attribute to schooling  an unduly high opportunity  cost.
Tanzania's  public  expenditure  review  reports that primary  enrollments  are falling  because
parents are questioning  the value  of education.
Figure  V1:  Implications  of Proposed
Sector Reforins  Analyzed  in Reports
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5.29  In general, the reports recommend  increased user fees at  higher levels of
education  as the most equitable  method of cost recovery. However,  several  reports note
that user fees for secondary  and higher education  are inequitable  if the few low-income
students  who reach  higher  education  are not given  scholarships.  Specific  population  groups
-particularly the rural poor and girls--have  inadequate  access  to education. But figures
for these groups are rarely included  in the reports. Only the Pakistan  report specifically
recommends  targeting girls.  Several reports discuss  regional imbalances  and ethnic or
language  disadvantages  (among  the Indian  population  in Guatemala  and Peru,  for example).
50The Peru report notes that the general inadequacy of the infrastructure disadvantages the
rural population because books and supplies are either unavailable or expensive.
5.30  Political and institutional factors.  About two-thirds of the reports refer to the
political or institutional feasibility of reforms. In the others, there is little discussion of the
threats to sector policies, even when they are obvious.  Eleven reports  mention interest
groups opposed to certain reforms--local  politicians, ethnic groups, urban populations--but
they usually do not discuss the implications of their opposition in detail.  Several reports
describe the political sensitivity  of cost recovery and the possible backlash from even those
groups able to pay, while others note opposition to targeted subsidies designed to benefit
disadvantaged groups.  Some reports describe institutional threats--the 'uigh  administrative
cost of cost-recovery  measures, the lack of local and parental commitment to reforms, poor
planning and  execution capabilities, and very often  a  complete lack of  materials  and
operational support.
5.31  The Peru  report discusses the political opposition to  reform, but it does not
develop a feasible alternative.  Both the Bank and the country's development plan advocate
more government spending for education. The Bank recommends raising the real spending
per student to the level of the 1970s,  but with a greater than concomitant increase in output
from organizational and efficiency  gains. However, the Bank recommends more recurrent
spending, partly at the expense of capital investments, and in so doing disagrees with the
country's general philosophy on development and with its education sector priorities.  The
government's investment plan calls for a large school-building  program, the implementation
of which would divert resources from the recurrent budget.  Since the government has
explicitly  rejected the Bank's development strategy as "failing  to respond to the immediate
exigencies of  Peru's...socio-political situation," and  since  'Without a  very  substantial
improvement in  the  organization and management of  the  educational system, none of
the...proposals  can be successfully  implemented,"  the prospects for implementation, let alone
for sustainability, are minimal.
5.32  The Nigeria review recommends cost shifting and cost recovery measures with
little  reference  to  institutional  feasibility.  The  report  projects  recurrent  and  capital
expenditures forward from 1985  to 1990. To do so, it divides  spending between federal and
state  levels, uses  population  and  enrollment projections to  determine  the  number  of
students at  each  level, estimates cost-recovery revenues, determines  a  composite cost
structure, and calculates an annual growth increment. For universities, a 10 percent fall in
spending per  student  is factored  into  the  estimate  for the  initial year  because  these
institutions are relatively well funded and "are most likely to be able to absorb a cut." Cost
recovery estimates are calculated on the basis of projected enrollments, and it is assumed
that  fees are  subject to  100 percent collection, although the  report  does  not  indicate
whether this level of collection presently exists.  The report  has made good use of the
information available, but  it  does  not  address  the  feasibility or  sustainability of  the
suggested reforms.  It  does not discuss the political power or institutional and revenue-
collecting sophistication of the states versus the federal government, nor does it analyze the
w.llingness of the federal university system to absorb funding cuts.  The Nigeria and Peru
reports  discussed here  are  from 1985 and  1987 respectively.  A clear learning curve is
51evident in recent reports.  Nevertheless, coverage of sustainability issues is sporadic at best
and deserves much more attention.
E.  Overall Assessment
5.33  The  staff  time  and  effort  required  to  produce  multivolume PERs  are  not
justified by the  results.41 PERs should be brief (no more than  100 pages) and  useful
information documents for negotiations between the Bank and the host country rather than
all-inclusive reviewsY  Given this caveat, the education specialist must consider carefully
what to include.  The purpose of the PER, to analyze the public sector budget, should be
clearly reflected in the sector review, which should outline the budgetary and institutional
issues that link the sector to the macroeconomy.
5.34  Since it is beyond the purview of a multisector review to go into detail about
issues and processes, an important first step is to create a comprehensive and functional
(rather  than administrative) budget that will bring together all education financing and
expenditures, regardless of source.  Such budgets will not only facilitate CESW, but also
make crosscountry comparisons more useful.  The sector specialist will be better  able to
c7onclude  that funding for education at a specific  level is too high or too low according not
only to personal expertise, but also to homogeneous comparative statistics.
5.35  The  true  level of funding for education is extremely difficult to  determine.
Categories such as "Ministry of Education expenditure" or "local government expenditure"
can present a misleading picture of the total level of resources.  The Bank should suggest
to governments that they move toward developing a comprehensive, multisource education
budget, and it should offer technical assistance for so doing.
5.36  The  need for detailed and analytical budgetary knowledge is not specific to
education.  The imbalance between capital and recurrent spending is probably the most
sector-specific concern in  the budget.  Any evaluation of capital and recurrent  costs is
hampered by the fact that portions of these costs are often hidden in noneducation line
items in the budget.  A standard list of items (see para. 6.07) should be included in any
expenditure review of the education sector so that there will be 1) an accurate correlation
with the total expenditure picture and 2) a basis for functional crosscountry comparisons
and judgments.
5.37  The success or failure of public expenditure recommendations often rests upon
the  Bank's understanding  of the  mechanics and  politics of the  budget process.  Cost
recovery measures were proposed in three-quarters of the reports, but the optimal level of
cost recovery cam,ot be determined if the true costs are overstated or understated.  Cost
recovery measures in such circumstances need to be analyzed in a general, rather than
4"PIRs  and PERs from 1985 to 1987  required, on average, 19 staff/consultants and 101  staff
weeks.  De Melo (1988), Table 1, p. 3.
2/Ibid.,  p. 14.
52partial equilibrium, framework. If not, they may be counterproductive in two ways. First,
they may lead to declining enrollments as in Tanzania (see para. 5.28). Second, they may
cause government  revenues to  decline as  fewer students are  enrolled  to  pay the  fee.
Additionally, there  is  little  incentive  for  the  Ministry of  Education  to  alienate  its
constituents by carrying out cost recovery  measures if, as is the case in many countries, the
revenues are returned to the Treasury rather than to the Ministry. The budget and budget
process need to be understood as institutional and political tools before feasible reforms
are suggested.
5.38  Since PERs focus on public recurrent spending, most of which is wages, they
need to emphasize the public sector wage structure.  An adequate understanding of the
salary structure in the wage-intensive  education sector relative to other sectors is a crucial
first step in determining whether specific policy proposals will have sector-neutral effects.
Such a  review is  essential in  any  PER  that  makes specific recommendations for  the
treatment  of public sector wages.
5.39  It is also important to specify  who controls revenues and expenditures and how
intersectoral and intrasectoral conflicts are to  be resolved.  The  Ministry of Education
probably has no administrative or political control over education resources assigned to
outside agencies, or even over the reallocation of specific  line items in its own budget. The
feasibility and sustainability of intrasectoral resource reallocations (a reform recommended
in three-quarters of the  reports) depends greatly upon an understanding of institutional
processes.  Coordinated sector  development is all  but  impossible when administrative
responsibility is fragnented  among several (often competing) ministries.  Effective and
sustainable reallocation of education sector resources may only be possible after policies
that address budget processes and their inflexibility  are in place.
53VL  CONCLUSIONS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.01  The goal of a public expenditure review is to add to the Bank's understanding
of how macro and sector priorities are determined and balanced over a given period of time
and  in  accordance with  explicit or  implicit priorities.  They are  a  useful vehicle for
highlighting  sector cost and financing issues and for analyzing them in the context of the
entire economy. PERs have become a useful tool in the public expenditure reform process,
but  there  is still a tendency to use them  to fill in  the gaps in sector knowledge.  This
process is an inefficient way to gather information and a less than optimal use of sector
expertise.
6.02  Approaches and methodologies vary greatly, as does sector coverage, even by
similar countries.  The sector specialist will always need to rely on personal experience
and intuitive judgment to some extent, but there is at present too much room for subjective
interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations.  These compromise the credibility of
policy recommendations.
6.03  Too  often  the  only connection between macroeconomic analysis and  sector
analysis is the budget constraint.  The best PERs from the  education sector perspective
develop other macro/sector  relationships.  CESW and reviews of the budget and budget
process precede the public expenditure review, which includes education and  the social
sectors in accordance with an explicit ranking of priorities.  Throughout the review, the
effects of changes in financing or policy at one level are taken into account when evaluating
reforms at another level.
6.04  Because the  budget  and budget process are  often  deliberately opaque,  the
evaluation of institutional and political priorities and constraints needs to be strengthened
in order to ensure the sustainability of policy reforms.  Greater realism in the assessment
of the political and social feasibility  of proposed sector strategies is necessary. Also needed
is better assessment of the institutional and managerial abilities of the agencies that will
be  called  upon  to  administer  reforms.  The  political  and  managerial  caveats  apply
particularly to the intrasectoral reallocation of resources and responsibilities.
6.05  The  chapter or  section in a  PER  on  education should provide an accurate
picture of how funds to  the  sector are  allocated and  disbursed.  Providing this picture
entails an evaluation of the expenditure data and the expenditure process.  In particular:
a)  If the budget process and the relationship of the budget to actual spending
are not transparent, then a budget process review may be a prerequisite for an
expenditure review.
b)  The PER cannot be substituted for CESW.  If the necessary data are not
available, ex ante sector work is a prerequisite for any PER that attempts to
make and evaluate macro and sector links.
54c)  For in-depth analysis of sector cost and financing issues, single-sector PERs,
or possibly social sector PERs, are more appropriate than multisector reviews.
6.06  Extensive detail is not a substitute for a well-focused analytic discussion of the
major issues, priorities, and policies of the sector and their relationship--economic,  political,
and institutional-to  the country's development program. Foremost, there should be a clear
rationale for the inclusion of education in the report and an explanation of the relationship
of the sector to the overall theme or agenda of the PER.
6.07  The education sector (like other social sectors) has specific characteristics that
affect the relationship between sector and macro expenditures and that can skew the impact
of "sector-neutral" policies.  PERs should pay explicit attention to these concerns, which
include:
a)  The  different  time  frames  for  the  attainment  of  macroeconomic and
education sector goals. Reports should be explicit if and when these differences
result in short-term conflicts about optimal resource allocation.
b)  The often substantial part of education sector spending (governmental and
nongovernmental) that is outside the purview and control of the  Ministry of
Education.  A multisource budget should be developed that includes allocations
to  the  sector  from  all  government  and  nongovernment  sources.  Simple
spreadsheet  programs  could  be  developed to  help  the  reorganization  and
tracking of government budget items by economic and sectoral functions.
c)  The overlap and lack of comprehensiveness of the capital and recurrent
budgets.  Capital spending on  education that  is outside the  purview of  the
Ministry  of  Education  should  be  included  in  the  education  expenditure
framework. Recurrent costs are often hidden in the investment budget.  While
this  procedure  may be  necessary in  p1actice, analytically the  two types of
spending should be  separated.  An  all-inclusive picture  of  the  capital  and
recurrent budgets and the relationship between them should be developed.
d)  The low ratio of capital to recurrent spending in the sector and the common
imbalance between them. The conmmon  economic  retrenchment policy  of cutting
recurrent costs in the short term can have a disastrous effect on the education
and social sectors if they are not protected.  Across-the-board cuts affect these
sectors  more  severely than  others,  and  such  policies  tend  to  exacerbate
imbalances  between (functional rather than budgetary) investment and recurrent
allocations to the sector.
e)  The low ratio of nonwage to wage expenditures  within the sector's recurrent
budget.  Any policy that proposes economy-wide adjustments in public sector
wages will likely affect the  education sector  more severely than  less wage-
intensive sectors. When these policies  are being considered, particular attention
must be paid ex ante to the wage structure and to the balance between teaching
55and nonteaching wage costs.  In particular, the ratio of nonsalary spending to
total recurrent spending by level of education is a useful crosscountry  indicator.
f)  The large and capital-intensive foreign financing component in many low-
income countries, which is often fragmented among many donors and projects.
The long-run goal in many countries might be to bring the Bank's influence to
bear on donor financing--to create a system for prioritizing and tracking needs
and for balancing investment and recurrent support.  In the short, run, collating
information on donor financing and its management would be a useful step.
6.08  The treatment of the education sector in PERs must be analyzed in the broader
context of Bank operations, in particular in the context of adjustment programs, which form
the background for the PERs in two-thirds of the countries reviewed.  This report is the
first step in a broader research agenda which includes:
a)  An analysis of the effects of adjustment-related operations on the education
sector.
b)  A discussion  of the treatment of the education sector in PERs in the context
of  the  economic  austerity  and  fiscal  retrenchment  that  often  form  the
background for policy reform.
c)  The development of guidelines for an improved analysis of education sector
cost and financing concerns in the macroeconomic expenditure context.
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IL  THE EDUCATION  SECIOR IN THE MACROECONOMIC  CONTEXT
A.  Justification  and operational  context  of review
1.  What is the focus  of the report?
To analyze  the impact of education  sector concerns  on the overall  public budget?
To analyze  primarily  the overall  public  budget with:
education  funding  as a targeted area for budgetary  concerns_
education  as a minor  area of concern_
not clear/not stated_
2.  Is the review  multisectoral  or on the education  sector only?
If multisectoral,  what sectors  are reviewed  in separate chapters  or sections?
How is education  treated?
an integral  sector-
a minor sector_
barely mentioned_
not treated at all
B. Assessment  of country  situation
1.  Country  situation at time of review
Country  income level:  LU LMI  UMI UI
Classified  as oil exporter?  Yes/No
Classified  as "highly  indebted"?  Yes/No
2.  Total government  expenditure  as a percentage  of GDP?  (For comparative
purposes,  data can be taken from World  Development  Report.)
Year?  _  Rising trend?_  _  Falling trend?




What is the time period for the analyis?  Short term  Long term
574.  Description  of country  economic  situation:
5.  What is the overall development strategy of the country?
Major policy  objectives?
Major  policy instruments?
6.  What is the stated time frame of the sector  review  and policy  proposals?
___medium term (3-5  yrs.) and/or
_l.ong  term (--> year 2000)
C.  Treatment  of macro-sector  interfaces
1.  Government  spending  on education  as a percentage  of all government  spending?
*Year?__  Rising  trend?_  _  Falling  trend?_  _
2.  Government  spending  on education  as a share of GDP??_  Year?_  _
Rising  trend?_  _  Falling  trend?
3.  Does the report discuss  the effect on education  of noneducation  policies  (for
example,  guaranteed  employment  for graduates,  wage  and civil  service  rigidities,
immigration,  emigration)?
4.  What external forces (demographics/labor  market needs) drive education  policy?
5.  Does the report mention specific  dangers  to the sustainability  of education  sector
priorities? Yes/No  Which?
D.  Sector issues
1.  Are there inefficiencies  in the provision  of education  according  to internal
efficiency  criteria?
-dropout  rates by problem  level
--repeater  rates by problem  level
_unit  cost per pupil by problem level
___enrollment  rates by problem  level
582.  Are there inefficiencies  in the provision  of education  according  to external
efficiency  criteria (for example,  employment  or unemployment  data by educational
level)?
3.  Summary  of sector issues  at time of report:
E.  Sector  objectives  and priorities
1.  What are the sector  objectives? Please specify  educational  levels.
_expansion/restructuring  education  systems
-quality  improvements
.. equity/access  improvements
.mproved  internal efficiency
-improved  external  efficiency
2.  Major policy  instruments,  if any?
3.  Do the macro-priorities  agree with the sector  priorities? Yes/No
Objectives  in accord?  Yes/No
If not, how and why is there disagreement?
Instruments  in accord?  Yes/No
If not, how and why is there disagreement?
IIL  SECITOR  COSTS  AND FINANCING
1.  Is government  spending  on education  as a share of all government  spending
too high?_  too low?_  Or is the level of spending  not a problem  by itself?_
As determined  by what information:
_falling  trend of education  spending/GDP  or education  spending/government
spending?
-rising  trend of educatian  spending/GDP  or education  spending/government
spending?
__regional or other intercountry  comparisons?
592.  Are there other budgets  (that is, other government  ministries)  in addition to the
educational  budget that are mentioned  as important  sources  of education
financing?  Yes/No  Which?
Are these included  in the quantitative  analysis? Yes/No
3.  Are regional or local governments  mentioned  as significant  sources  of education
financing? Yes/No  Role evaluated  quantitatively?  Yes/No
4.  Is the private sector mentioned  as a significant  provider  of education? Yes/No
Role evaluated  quantitatively?  Yes/No
5.  Is the private sector mentioned  as a significant  source  of education  financing?
Yes/No
Role evaluated  quantitatively?  Yes/No
6.  Is there intrasectoral  misallocation  of resources?  Yes/No
As determined  by what information:
-Percentage  of all central government  education  spending  for primary
education?  too high?  too low?-
based upon what criteria?
Percentage  of all central govermment  education  spending  for secondary
education?  too high?-  too low?-
based upon what criteria?
-Percentage  of all central government  education  spending  for vocational
education?  too high?_  too low?
based upon what criteria?
Percentage  of all central government  education  spending  for higher education?
too high?_  tGo  low?
based upon what criteria?
7.  Are there inefficiencies  in the provision  of education  according  to government
budgetary  criteria?
-capital  vs. recurrent costs_
_insufficient  funds for maintenance_
-- insufficient funds for materials/supplies
-within  recurrent costs,  wage  vs. nonwage  costs_
_teaching vs. nonteaching  wage  costs_
ratio of teachers' salaries  to per capita GNP_t
or to average  civil  service  income_
8.  Speciffic  budge.  - misallocations  by educational  level:
(according  tc a.  or other criteria)
60IV.  SECIYR FINANCING  STRATEGIES
1.  Adjustment to public expenditure priorities
Maintain level of funding to education sector?_
Increase public spending on education?9
Reduce public spending on education?_
Unclear/Not  stated
2.  How is this adjustment to be effected'
Redistribute budget allocations among sectors?  How?
Reduce educational unit costs?  How?




-user  fees/cost recovery?
_other  private sector contribution to education financing?
3.  Are the financing conclusions  realistic in light of the overall macroeconomic
situation?  Yes/No  If not, how and why not?
4.  Do the financing conclusions agree with the educational sector objectives?
Yes/No  If not, how and why not?
V.  METhODOLOGY
A.  Sector coverage
1.  Did an education sector specialist participate in the mission/report preparation?
Yes/No
2.  What is known about prior public expenditures?
There have been several/many years of Bank experience and reliable data___
There are underlying courtry/expenditure/sector  studies that are:
included in the review____
referred  to in the review
implied but not mentioned_
The Bank has little experience in the country-
Not clear/not  stated-
613.  Review of education sector
a.  Analysis covers recurrent budget?.  capital budget?  both?_
Only central government spending on education?_
Only Ministry of Education spending?-
Central and local government spending on education?
Non-central government spending on education?
private schools?_
private contributions?
External spending on education?
b.  Reviews all levels of education_





Is any attention paid to vocational education and training?  Yes/No
At which levels?
4.  Data
a.  Are the data government-generated?  Yes/No
From government planning documents?_
From actual expenditure/investment documents?
Bank-generated?  Yes/No
b.  Are the data accurate and reliable?  Yes/No
Not clear/not  stated_
c.  Does the report state which data are missing?  Yes/No  Which?
d.  Does the report state which data are presumed inaccurate/unreliable?  For
example, ghost workers, inconsistencies  between ministry statistics.
Yes/No  Which?
B.  Sector analysis
1.  Are comparisons made with other countries? Yes/No
How are the comparator countries selected (neighboring, similar per capita GNP,
similar economic structure)?
For which data?
2.  Financing Model:
a.  Was an education sector financing model usea?  Yes/No
For which level(s) of education?
62b.  What is the objective  of the model?
Minimize  expenditure  for a given  set of educational
objectives?
Maxrimize  objective  for a given resource  availability  (budget
constraint)?
To quantify  a financing  gap?_
c.  How are trade-offs  among  multiple  objectives  determined?
Cost-effectiveness_
Clear government  policy  priorities-
Intuitive/subjective  assessment  by Bank_-_
Not clear/not stated_
d.  Were alternative  scenarios  generated? Yes/No  Specify:
e.  Are efficiency  improvements  assumed  in the model simulations? Yes/No
For which  educational  level(s)
Specify:
C.  Institutional  issues
1.  Is the sector strategy: Government-generated?
Bank-generated?
Genesis  unclear/not stated?_
2.  Is there any discussion  of the political/institutional  feasibility  of proposed  changes?
Yes/No
3.  Are the equity implications  of macroeconomic  and sector policies  clearly  stated
and explored?  Yes/No
4.  Is the social impact  of the proposed  policy  changes  analyzed?  Yes/No  Specify:
5.  Additional  remarks:
63ANNEX Ii:  UST OF REPORTS  REVIEWED
Africa
Botswana  6031-BT: Public Expenditure and Development in Botswana (June 3,
1986)
Burldna  Faso  Cogts, Financement et Politique de l'Education au Burkina Faso (May
7, 1987)
Camer.oon  7451-CM: Adapting Public Finances to a Changing Macroeconomic
Environment (October 6, 1988)
Central  Afrin  Public  Expenditure  Review  (October  23, 1989)
Cote dvoire  6051-IVC: The C6te d'Ivoire in Transition:  From Structural
Adjustment to Self-Sustained  Growth (March 9, 1987)
Ghana  5824-GH:  Priorities for Public Expenditures, 1986-1988  (August 13,
1985)
Possibilites Budgetaires et Besoins Financiers du Secteur de l'Education
en R6publique du Guinee, J. Orivel et J. Perrot (November 1988)
Kenga  7508-KE: Public Expenditure Issues (April 14, 1989)
Lnsoth  7243-LSO: Public Expenditure Priorities in Lesotho (September 28,
1988)
Madagascar  7803-MAG: Public Expenditure, Adjustment and Growth (December
20, 1989)
Malawi  7281-MAI: Public Expenditure Review (February 10, 1989)
Mali  Coaits,  Financement et Efficacite des Enseignements Superieur et
Secondaire au Mali (November 1988)
Moafmbique  7615-MOZ:  Public Expenditure Review (September 5, 1989)
Nier  Cofts, Financement et Politique de l'Education au Niger (July 13,
1988)
Nigeia  Education Sector Expenditure Review (July 1985)
64Rwanda  7717-RW: Public Expenditure  Program: An Instrument  of Economic
Strategy  (October 19, 1989)
_1w  6450-SE: A Review  of the Three-Year  Public  Investment  Program,
1987/88-1989/90  (February  26, 1987)
Sierra  ILone  5513-SL: Review  of the Public  Expenditure  Program (September  13,
1985)
TIzania  7559-TA: Public Expenditure  Review  (May  22, 1989)
Zambia  6438-ZA: Public Expenditure  Review  (October  6, 1987)
Zimbabwec  Public  Expenditure  Review  (February  1986)
Bang  adeh  7545-BD: Public Expenditure  Review: A Framework  for Public
Resource Management  in the Fourth Five Year Plan Period, FY91-95
(March 13, 1989)
Ehilizwines  7473-PH: Education  Sector Study  (December 1988)
Europe. Middle  East and North Africa
J.QFtdanl  5697-JO: Efficiency  and Equity  of Govermment  Revenues  and Social
Expenditures  (June 1986)
4156-MOR: Priorities  for Public  Sector Investment  1981-1985  (June
15, 1983)
5962-PAK:  Economic  and Social  Development  Prospects  (February 18,
1986)
Tunisia  5622-TUN: Financing  of Education: Past Trends and Future
Developments  (April 22, 1985)
lbrkey  6249-TU: Education  and Training  Sector Survey  (September  1986)
Latin America.  Caribbean
Biovia  7746-BO: Public Sector  Expenditure  Review  with a Special Emphasis
on the Social  Sectors  (September  15, 1989)
65Qalambia  7891-CO: Public  Sector Expenditure  Review  (August  1, 1989)
CD=bi  7877-CR: Public  Sector Expenditure  Review  (September  21. 1989)
Gatemal  7478-GU: Public  Sector Expenditure  Review  (May  23, 1989)
Hi  6113-HA: Public  Expenditure  Review  (September  29, 1986)
Handucaa  7861-HO: Public  Sector  Expenditure  Review  (December  6, 1989)
6371-ME: Public  Sector Investment  Review-A Joint Report (August  5,
1986)
E1  6528-PE: Public  Expenditure  Review  (January 29, 1987)
66ANNEX  m:  COUNTRY  TYPOLOGY
This annex documents the country  typology  adopted for the comparative analysis
of PER policy conclusions related to education cost and financing issues.  The typology
essentially classifies countries according to  the  basic policy-related determinants of the
supply of public resources to the education sector. At this stage, it is limited to the sample
countries covered in the present PER study. It is also static, as it relies on country data for
one  single  benchri;ark year.  Ultimately,  its usefulness should  benefit  from  a  more
comprehensive coverage, as well as from the incorporation of patterns of recent changes
in key variables.
I.  The Methodological Framework
From  a  resource  availability perspective, the  absolute level of  govermnent
spending on education (SR) can be seen as the product of three basic factors:  the level  of
GNP (Y), that is, the total supply of national resources;  the efficiency of public resource
mobilization (PRM), as reflected by the ratio of government revenue to GNP;  and sector
resource  allocation (SRA),  that  is, the  part of government expenditure absorbed in the
education sector.  In formula:
SR  = Y * PRM*SRA.
For crosscountry  comparison, the relative level of sector resources (SRM) is being defined
in terms of GNP, and therefore:
SRM = PRM * SRA.
Sector resource  availability thus depends on  two policy-related parameters:
resource mobilization and resource allocation. In the PER context, the former concerns the
country team's macroeconcmist, or public finance expert, while the latter is the major focus
of interaction between the macroeconomist and the sector specialist. It thus seems relevant,
in the context of this review. to classify  countries according to their respective PRM and
SRA levels.
However, whether the supply of public resources for education is high or low
by  international  standards  bears  little  relation  to  the  sector's  actual  financing needs.
Government spending on education may represent a substantial proportion of GNP, perhaps
at the limit of sustainable resource mobilization and sector allocation, and still not meet the
sector's overall financing requirement.  Short of a comprehensive accounting framework of
sector  financing needs,  an  international  comparison of  public spending on  education
therefore  still  ought  to  incorporate  some  comparative  notion  of  sectoral  output
performance.  To this end, countries have been further distinguished according to  their
primary enrollment rate (PE), which was selected in view of the high priority of achieving
universal primary education  among sector  objectives, as well as  the  large  amount  of
education financing absorbed by this subsector (around 40 percent on average in developing
countries). However, since PE. in addition to sector resource mobilization parameters, also
67reflects countries' overall level of development, it would seem justified to eliminate the
influence of this structural long-term relationship in order to obtain a universally  applicable
comparative  output  criterion.  This  was  done  by  correcting PE  for  the  "estimated"
contribution of per capita GNP (see table 1).
I.  The Country Typology
The PER reports selected for review  cover a sample of 36 countries, 19  of which
are in the low-income range.  This sample was subdivided with respect to each of the three
typology parameters  into "high" and "low"  country groupings, depending on whether the
parameter  value for each country lies above or below the median value of the sample.
"High"  and "low"  are thus relative terms that do not indicate value judgments.  All country
data  are from the  Bank's  1989 World Development Report,  complemented from other
sources where needed.  Parameter values in the sample are shown in table 1.
The first step in the development of the typology is to combine the PRM and
SRA criteria into a sector financing matrix, which characterizes each country according to
its "high"  or "low"  status with respect to the  policy determinants of overall sector resource
availability.  This matrix, shown in table 2, provides a rough comparative framework of
basic priorities with regard to sector financing issues. The actual position of countries on
the PRM and SRA scales is illustrated in figure 1.
Table  3 completes the  country typology.  It  shows the  net  outcome of  the
interaction of  PRM and SRA, that is, the  overall level of sector resource mobilization
relative to GNP (SRM), referenced against the selected educational output criterion (PE).
The actual position of countries on the SRM and PE scales is illustrated in figure 2.  In
addition, table 2 indicates for each country the critical parameter(s)--PRM, SRA, or both
-determining  the high or low status of SRM.
Of the 36 countries Li the review, 20 have a comparatively  low level of sector
resource mobilization, including 12 of the 19 low-income countries.1Y  On the educational
output-side, however, 19 countries have a  comparatively high primary enrollment rate,
including 9 low-income countries.
Surprisingly,  the largest category emerging from the typology  in table 3 consists
of 13 countries with low sector resource mobilization (SRM) and high sector output (PE).
This may be interpreted in several ways, depending on country-specific  circumstances: a
relatively high proportion of SRM is allocated to primary education;  central government
spending on education in general, or on primary education in particular, represents only a
small proportion of total  spending because local government or private contributions are
high;  SRM has been declining in recent years, but this has so far affected quality rather
than PE.
l/The median SRM (2.67) represents the product of the median PRM and median SRA,
rather than the median of the product of the two medians.
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Public  Sector  Sector  Primary
Resource  Resource  Resource  Enrollment
Mobilization Allocation  Mobilization Rate
COUNTRY  (PRM)  (SRA)  (SRM)  (PE*)
Bangladesh  9.5  10.6  1.01  76.85
Bolivia  3.2  11.6  0.37  88.79
Botswana  75.2  18.4  13.84  89.94
Burkina Faso  15.3  19.0  2.91  50.77
Cameroon  19.4  12.7  2.46  94.81
Central African Rep.  17.9  24.0  4.30  76.76
Colombia  13.8  19.0  2.62  92.13
Costa Rica  23.7  16.2  3.84  66.87
C6te d'Ivoire  28.2  35.9  10.12  74.06
Ghana  14.5  23.9  3.47  71.60
Guatemala  12.7  16.6  2.11  64.53
Guinea  23.1  7.9  1.82  40.11
Haiti  10.4  6.0  0.62  87.68
Honduras  25.9  18.1  4.69  95.55
Jordan  30.7  13.8  4.24  57.66
Kenya  20.8  23.1  4.80  104  7I
Lesotho  22.0  15.5  3.41  124
Madagascar  15.1  16.0  2.42  136.
Malawi  22.6  10.8  2.44  80.85
Mali  15.1  25.0  3.78  37.06
Mexico  13.3  8.7  1.16  70.98
Morocco  25.6  16.9  4.33  79.72
Mozambique  20.0  4.0  0.80  98.49
Niger  11.3  21.0  2.37  42.26
Nigeria  18.5  5.9  1.09  101.32
Pakistan  16.7  2.6  0.43  54.04
Peru  11.9  21.0  2.50  91.89
Philippines  12.9  18.0  2.32  107.43
Rwanda  12.7  28.0  3.56  78.83
Senegal  19.7  21.8  4.29  58.94
Sierra Leone  6.5  12.8  0.83  56.83
Tanzania  16.3  8.3  1.35  85.13
Tunisia  34.4  14.3  4.92  98.28
Turkey  18.5  12.6  2.33  96.21
Zambia  24.4  8.3  2.03  117.62
Zimbabwe  28.9  20.3  5.87  130.79
Medianh/  17.3  16.1  2.79  80.29
71"/Cross-sectional  regression  of PE on per capita  GNP (in $000)  yields  the following  result:
PE  =  0.36  GNP + 0.59  R2 = 0.32
(0.09)
This  estimate  was used to normalize  each country's  PE to the sample's  median per capita
GNP level ($630);  hence:
PE  = PE - 0.36 '  (GNP - 0.63)
k/Excluding  Botswana  (extremely  high PRM) and Nigeria (very  low SRA, reflecting  only
federal budget).
Sourc:  World Development  Report 1989.
Table 2:  Educatiofl  Sector Resourc Availabilit
I-HGH SRA  LOW SRA
HIjGHi  Botswana  Cameroon
MRM  CAR  Guinea
C6te d'Ivoire  Jordan







LIW  Burkina  Faso  Bangladesh





Peru  Sierra Ieone
Philippines  Tanzania
Rwanda
Note:  Low-income  countries  are in bold.
'/Federal spending  on eiucation is only about one-third  of total sector spending.
Nigeria  would be a high SRA country  if state expenditures  were taken into account.
72Table 3:  Sector Resource Mobilization and Educational Outut
IGH SRM  LOW SRM
Critical  ~~~~~Critical
Prmeterd/  ParmeeP
IUQHTunisia  PRM  Philippines  PRM
D.~  Lesotho  PRM  Colombia  PRM
Botswana  PRM/SRA  Peru  PRM
Kenya  PRM/SRA  Turkey  SRA
Zimbabwe  PRM/SRA  Cameroon  SRA
Honduras  PRM/SRA  Malawi  SRA






WDW  Jordan  PRM  Niger  PRM
PE  Burkina Faso  SRA  Guatemala  PRM
Ghana  SRA  Guinea  SRA
Mali  SRA  Palcistan  PRM/SRA
Rwanda  SRA  Sierra L  PRM/SRA
Morocco  PRM/SRA  Bangladesh  PRM/SRA
CAR  PRM/SRA  Mexico  PRM/SRA
COte d'lv.  PRM/SRA
Senegal  PRM/SRA
Costa Rica  PRM/SRA
Note:  Low-income countries are in bold.
i/Policy parameter(s)--PRM, SRA, or both-responsible for SRM being high or low.
The next largest group consists of 10 countries that combine a high SRM with
a low PE.  In this group, the high spending on education (whether because of high SRA,
high PRM, or both) is not matched by a high sector output.  A major issue for further
analysis is therefore  one  of efficiency in the  use and  intrasectoral allocation of  sector
resources.  The high SRM status of the low-income countries in this group is largely due
to a comparatively high SRA, which more than offsets a low PRM.  This raises the issue
of the sustainability of the government's strong commitment to education in the face of low
73initial levels of educational output, low absolute levels of mobilizable resources, and the low
efficiency of, or potential for, public resource mobilization.
The two remaining groups of countries are straightforward,  in the sense that high
or low levels of sector resource mobilization correspond to high or low levels of educational
output.  In the former case, sector savings might be pessible.  In the latter case, it would
seem imperative that SRA increase where it appears a critical factor in the low comparative
level of sector resource availability;  this  tpplies to four of the five low-income countries
in the group.
A closer look at table 3 suggests that SRA r..ther than PR{M  determines the
position of low-income  countries on the SRM scale. PKM appears to play a more dominant
role in the deter-i-ination of sector resource availability in middle-income countries.  This
phenomenon has an evidenit  procedural implication in the PER context, namely: adequate
public resource  allocation to education ought to  be given stronger emphasis in poorer
ccuntries, where the overall resource base is weaker, than in richer countries.
III.  Interpretation of the Country Typologv
This section reviews  the policy  diagnosis and strategic implications of the sector
financing situations arising from the interplay of public resource mobilization and sector
resource allocation.  The same series of sector financing situations is reviewed twice: once
in  conjunction with  a  high level of  educational  output  (subsection A),  and  again in
conjunction with a low level of educational output (subsection B).
A.  HIGH PE
A1.  LOW PRM/LOW SRA:  Inadequate supply of public resources to
the  sector,  reflecting  low  public  resource  mobilization  and  a  weak
commitment by the govermnent to education. There may thus be a - equity
issue at the primary level, since high PE, under public resource constraint,
probably means substantial  parental and community  contributions, or a two-
tier system (low qualty/low  cost for the poor, and vice-versa). SRA needs
to be increased, for support of equity objectives and quality improvements
at the primary level, in particular where PE includes high repetition rates.
Additional  public  financing  should  also  benefit  postprimary  levels,
depending on the specific  cost-effectiveness  situation.  Countries: Bolivia,
Haiti, Madagascar, Tanzania.
A.2.  JLOW  PRMlIHIQH SRA:
(a)  LOW SRM: Inadequate supply of public resources to the sector, in
spite of strong commitment to education by the government.  The
sustainability of SRA is at issue, depending on the  prospects for
gradually raising PRM.  Mobilization of nongovernment resources
may be required for quality improvements  and possibly  for improving
access to postprimary  levels. Countries: Colombia, Peru, Philippines.
74(b)  HI-GH  SRM:  Strong commitment by the government to education
guarantees in principle ap adequate supply of public resources to the
sector, in spite of low public resource mobilization. Sector efficiency
gains  might be  used  to  provide  temporary  relief  to  the  PRM
constraint, particularly in highly  indebted countries. Countries: none
in the sample.
A.3.  HI-GH  k iAM/LOW  SRA:
(a)  LOW SRM:  Inadequate  supply of public resources to the sector,
reflecting weak commitment to  education.  The high PRM level
would justify raising SRA, particularly in  low-income countries.
Postprimary levels likely command F  sme priority in the allocation of
incremental sector resources. Quality and equity may  also be at issue
at the primary level. Countries:  Cameroon, Malawi, Mozambique,
Nigeria (see, however, note a in table 2), Zambia, Turkey.
(b)  HIGH  SRM:  In principle, adequate supply of public resources to
the sector, thanks to high public resource mobilization.  However,
unfulfilled sector objectives  and outstanding quality and equity issues
might require a higher level of government commitment to education,
particularly  where  PRM  prospects  are  uncertain.  Countries:
Lesotho, Tunisia.
A.4.  HIGH PRM/HIGH  SRA:  Adequate supply of public resources to
the sector.  There is in principle financial room for addressing sector-wide
quality issues  and equity concerns. Countries: Botswana,  Honduras, Keilya,
Zimbabwe.
B.  LOW PE
B.1.  LOW PRMILOW SRA:  Overall sector underfinancing from public
and private sources.  An increase in SRA is required;  this may not be
enough, however, to ensure an adequate supply of sector resources, given
the low level of public resource mobilization.  SRA may be particularly
difficult to increase in highly indebted countries. The combination of sector
underfinancing and the low  piimary enrollment rate generally suggests  that
efficiency  at all levels should be increased and more equitable intrasectoral
allocation of public resourcec should be promoted.  Temporary external
support to the recurrent budget may be required in low-income  countries.
Cour.tries:  Bangladesh, Mexico, Pakistan, Sierra Leone.
B.2.  LOW PRM/HIGH  SRA:
(a)  LOV SRM:  Overall sector underfinancing in spite of government's
strong commnitn*ent  to education.  As in A.2 (a), sustainability of
75SRA is at iasue.  Low PE points toward the need to focus on
efficiency  in the use and allocation  of sector resources  at all levels.
Direct efficiency  gains and cost recovery  measures  at higher levels
could  free resources  for quality  improvements  and expansion  at the
primary  level. Temporary  external  support  to recurrent  budget may
be required  in low-income  countries. Countries:  Guatemala,  Nigcr.
(b)  HIGH SRM:  Strong but ineffective  government  commitmeL.  to
education.  The  situation appears characteristic of  low-income
countries: in view of the limited  resource base (from an absolute
income  level and mobilization  efficiency  perspective),  as well as the
low initial educational output situation, even a  relatively high
apparent sector resource  mobilization  remains  insufficient  to meet
actual  sector needs.  The  sustainability  of  the  government's
commitment  is therefore an issue.  For the rest, sector strategic
priorities  are similar  to B.2 (a).  Countries: Burkina  Faso, Ghana,
Mali, Rwanda.
B3.  HIGH PRM LOW SRA:
(a)  LOW SRM:  Given low PE, high PRM makes this a  case for
increasing  SRA.  Incremental public financing  is to be used for
primary  education,  in part to relieve  the financial  burden on parents
and communities.  Temporary  external  support to recurrent budget
may be required. Countries: Guinea.
(b)  HIGH SRM:  High public resource mobilization  generates in
principle  an autquate supply  of resources  despite the government's
weak  commitment  to education.  The low  PE, however,  points  toward
major inefficiencies  in the use and allocation of sector resources.
Comprehensive  sector  reforms  are thus  required,  possibly  combined
with some increase  in SRA. Countries: Jordan.
B.4  HIGH PRM/IIGH  SRA: Strong  but ineffective  commitment  by the
government to  education, under  relatively adequate public resource
mobilization  conditions.  This is the archetypal  case for sector  adjustment
to improve  efficiency  in the use and allocation of budgetary  resources,
primarily  in favor  of primary  education. For the highly  indebted  countries,
the high SRA may not be sustainable. A sector adirstment loan may be
an appropriate  vehicle for required sector reforms,  providing  temporary
budget  relief  until  efficiency  gains  are realized. Countries:  Central  African
Republic,  Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire,  Morocco,  Senegal.
76ANNEX  IV: COMPARATIVE  ANALYSIS  OF  SECTOR  FINANCING  STRATEGIES:  SUMMARY  OF  OUTCOMES
(Percentage  of countries  in each category)
Low  SRMI Low  SRMI High  SRMI High  SRM/  Low  High  Low  High  Low  Middle
Low  PE  High PE  Low  PE  High PE  SRM  SRM  PE  PE  Income Income Total
(7)  (13)  (10)  (6)  (20)  (16)  (17)  (19)  (19)  (17)  (36)
Improving  71  31  10  0  45  6  35  21  37  18  28
Stable  14  31  30  67  25  44  24  42  21  47  33
Dotiwrating  0  31  50  33  20  44  29  32  26  35  31
Low  71  62  20  17  65  19  41  47  53  35  44
Hgh  0  8  40  50  5  44  24  21  16  29  22
Intraset  aliocaflon
LOW  pimay  71  23  70  33  40  56  71  26  53  41  47
-I  I.owpostpimary  29  15  20  0  20  13  24  11  11  24  17
High posrmary  71  62  90  67  65  81  82  63  74  71  72
Budget  57  92  90  67  80  81  76  84  89  71  81
Intemal  71  100  90  67  90  81  82  89  89  82  86
Exernal  29  77  60  67  60  63  47  74  63  59  61
Sector  obpecws
Access
Primay  86  62  80  67  70  75  82  63  84  59  72
Postprimar  43  46  30  50  45  38  35  47  42  41  42
Quality  kmpvement
Primary  71  92  90  67  85  81  82  84  95  71  83
Postpinary  43  54  40  50  50  44  41  53  42  53  47
Equity
Primy  57  54  50  50  55  50  53  53  42  65  53
Possprmay  14  23  10  0  20  6  12  16  16  12  14Low  SRM/ Low  SRM/ High  SRMW  High SRMI  Low  High  Low  High  Low  MKidle
Low PE  High PE  Low PE  High PE  SRM  SRM  PE  PE  Income  Income Total
(7)  (13)  (10)  (6)  (20)  (16)  (17)  (19)  (19)  (17)  (36)
Sector objecives  (cont)
Internal  efficiency
Primary  43  54  40  67  50  50  41  58  47  53  s0
Postprimary  43  46  30  33  45  31  35  42  42  35  39
External  efficiency
Primary  14  0  40  33  5  38  29  11  21  18  19
Postprimary  14  31  50  17  25  38  35  26  32  29  31
Sector  financng
Redisrbute  86  77  100  33  80  75  94  63  95  59  78
CosUeffcienlcy  86  92  30  67  90  75  82  84  89  76  83
Newsources  71  77  70  17  75  50  71  58  68  59  64
4  Costrecovery  71  77  100  50  75  81  88  68  79  76  78
Public  spending
Increase  86  69  20  17  75  19  47  53  53  47  50
Maintain  14  31  80  83  25  81  53  47  47  53  50
SRM: Sector resource  mobilization
PE: Primary  enrollment  rate
Note: Numbers  in parentheses  denote  total number  of countries  in each category,  one report per country.ANNEX  V: SECTORS  CONSIDERED  IN REPORTS
Human
Education Health Resources  Water  Housing  Agriculture  Manufacturing  Mining
Bangladesh  X  X  X  x
Boliia  X  X
Botswana  X  X  X
Burkina Faso  X
Cameroon  X  X  x
CAR  X  x
Colombia  X  X
Costa Rica  X  X  X  X
C8te d'ivolre  X  X  X  X
Ghana  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
Guatemala  X  X  x  x  x
Guinea  X
Haiti *  X  X  X  X
Honduras  X  X  X  X  X
Jordan  X  X  X  X
Kenya  X  X  X
Lesotho  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
Madagascar  X  X
Malawi *  X  X  X  X  X
Man  X
Mexico *  X  X  X  X  X
Morocco  X  X  X  X  X  X
Mozambique  X  X  X
Niger  X
Nigeria  X
Pakistan*  X  X
Peru-  X  X  X  X  X  X
Phflippines  x
Rwanda  X  X  X  X  X  X
Senegal  X  X  x
SlerraLeone*  X  X  X  X  X  X
Tanzania-  X  X  X  X  X  X
Tunisia  X
Turkey  X
Zambia  X  X  X  X
Zimbabwe'  X
79Energy/  Urban  lnfrastructurel
Industry Power Transportaton  Communications Development  Works




Cameroon  X  X
CAR  X
Coombi  X
CostaRica  x  X  x
Ctte d'1volre'
Ghana  X  X  X
Guatemala  X  X  X  X
Guinea
H4aliI  X  x  X
Honduras  X  X  x
Jordan  X
Kenya  x  x
Lesotho  X  X  X  X  X
Madagascar  X
Malawi  X  X  X
Manl
Mexlco  X  X  X  X





Peru  '  X
Philippines
Awanda  X  X  x
Senegal  X  X  X  x  x
Sierra  Leone  X  X  X
Tanzanla*  X  X  X  X  X
T  unlsia
Turkey
Zambla'  X  X  X  x
ZInbabwe  _  _
80Other sectors included in reports:
Bangladesh:  Natural resources
Bolivia:  Social Security
Cote d'lvoire:  Population, Finance
Haiti:  Electric Power, Public Industrial Enterprises
Malawi:  Forestry
Mexico:  Marketing & Storage
Pakistan:  Population
Peru:  Electric Power, Petroleum
Sierra Leone:  Tourism
Tanzania:  Natural Resources
Zambia:  Roads, Development Administration
Zimbabwe:  Defense, Public  Enterprises
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